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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study summarises the information provided by the Member States in their annual 
voluntary reports on their experience and progress concerning cooperation on fraud 
and error in the reference year 2016, as provided for in Decision H5 of the 
Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems.1 The 
Member States’ reports have been analysed with the aim of identifying several 
elements. First, particular attention goes to the steps taken throughout the year to 
prevent and combat fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination. 
Secondly, the aim of the country reports was to identify specific problems in 
implementing the EU coordination rules which may lead to, at least risks of, fraud and 
error. Thirdly, an outline is provided of the steps taken to promote compliance by 
institutions and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to provide 
information to citizens, in the field of benefits in kinds. Fourthly, the report notes good 
practices, lessons learned and remaining issues or concerns when dealing with cross-
border cooperation and information exchange within the framework of Regulations 
(EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the coordination of social security 
systems. Fifthly, the report summarises the examples of or proposals or suggestions 
for measures to improve the overall tackling of fraud and error in the field of social 
security coordination which National Contact Points (NCPs) can operationalise without 
the need for changes to national or EU law. Also some additional remarks, made by a 
few Member States, are inserted at the end of this report. Finally, the report contains 
an Annex I (National legislation relevant to preventing and combating social security 
fraud and error within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 
987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems, including the relevant 
definitions of fraud and error and penalties and sanctions that apply) and an Annex II 
(Inventory of bilateral agreements and bilateral cooperation arrangements with other 
EU or EEA Member States entered into for the purposes of combating fraud and error 
within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the 
coordination of social security systems). 
First of all, the reports reveal that fraud and error in the field of social security are still 
generally recognised as problematic phenomena. The provided data confirm this 
finding. The increase of national legislation concerning fraud and error is additional 
proof thereof, although national legislation specifically dealing with fraud and error 
under the Regulations seems to be lacking.  
Concerning the steps taken in dealing with fraud and error, the national reports reveal 
that Member States focus on prevention of fraud and error as well as combating it. 
Information dissemination among institutions, healthcare providers and citizens in 
order to promote compliance with the coordination rules, is vital in the prevention of 
and fight against fraud and error, as demonstrated by the focus thereupon by the 
Member States. In addition, information exchange and cooperation between internal 
competent authorities as well as the competent authorities in other Member States are 
just as important. Various bilateral agreements on data exchange were concluded and 
working groups concerning fraud and error in the field of social security were set up.  
                                                 
1 Decision No H5 of 18 March 2010 concerning cooperation on combating fraud and error within 
the framework of Council Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social security systems (Text of 
relevance to the EEA and to the EC/Switzerland Agreement) (2010/C 149/05), OJ C149 of 
8.6.2010, 5-7. 
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Still, a number of difficulties remain problematic in a majority of Member States when 
attempting to combat fraud and error in the field of social security coordination. These 
shared issues include, amongst others, the delayed or absent cooperation between the 
competent authorities in the respective Member States, the determination of residence 
and the applicable legislation, and issues concerning (data protection in the context 
of) the exchange of data.    
Overall, the report reveals two broad conclusions. First and foremost, all reporting 
Member States have undertaken efforts to fight fraud and error, albeit on different 
levels or with varying intensity. These efforts repeatedly concentrate on strengthening 
the information exchange and cooperation between internal competent authorities as 
well as the competent authorities in other Member States. Secondly, one of the 
predominant concerns amongst all Member States relates to the delay in or absence of 
cooperation or exchange of data between the competent institutions of the respective 
Member States. In turn this results in scenarios where – amongst others – illegitimate 
double affiliation and/or undue payments occur. Improvement thus remains possible 
and necessary – both with regard to the prevention and early detection of fraud and 
error in cross-border situations as well as concerning cross-border administrative 
cooperation and information exchange between Member States.  
Figures on fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination were collected 
through the thematic questionnaires launched by HIVA within the framework of the 
Administrative Commission and integrated in the report written by IRIS. According to 
these data, most of the reporting Member States did not detect cases of fraud and 
error with regard to the EU provisions on planned cross-border healthcare, healthcare 
provided to persons residing in a Member State other than the competent Member 
State, the export of unemployment benefits and finally maternity and equivalent 
paternity benefits. This is in contrast to the EU provisions on applicable legislation, 
unplanned necessary healthcare, family benefits and old-age pensions.    
10 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Restrictions to the free movement of persons can and do appear in many different 
respects, not in the least in the field of social security, where both fraudulent and 
erroneous situations can put a strain on the free movement of persons. With respect 
to social security coordination, fraud is defined as “any act or omission to act, in order 
to obtain or receive social security benefits or to avoid obligations to pay social 
security contributions, contrary to the law of a Member State” while error is defined as 
"an unintentional mistake or omission by officials or citizens".2 Although both fraud 
and error often end up having the same effects, the capital difference between them is 
the fact that fraud cases require proof of intent, whereas error is unintentional. 
Strong cooperation between Member States is crucial in order to prevent and combat 
fraudulent and erroneous situations in the realm of social security coordination. In 
order to boost and strengthen this cooperation, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems3 has provided for the establishment of several 
mechanisms (e.g. Decision A1; Decision H5). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that 
only a few specific references to fraud and error are made in Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004.4 The Administrative Commission is, in accordance with said Regulation, 
responsible for handling questions of interpretation concerning the Regulation’s 
provisions or concerning agreements or accords concluded in the framework of the 
Regulation. In addition to the Administrative Commission, there is a Technical 
Commission, which among other things assembles technical documents and studies; 
an Audit Board, which establishes the average costs for the reimbursement of 
healthcare costs in Member States; and an Advisory Committee, which is responsible 
for preparing opinions and proposals for the Administrative Commission.  
At the 307th meeting of the Administrative Commission, the Member States decided to 
create an Ad Hoc Group in order to assist the Administrative Commission in its efforts 
to strengthen the cooperation between competent institutions, particularly concerning 
the fight against social security fraud and error. This Ad Hoc Group has produced two 
reports on this type of fraud and error issues and has identified some major problem 
areas. The conclusions and recommendations led to Decision H5 in March 2010. As 
stated in that Decision, the Administrative Commission discusses cooperation on fraud 
and error issues once a year, based on the voluntary reporting by the Member States 
of experiences and progress in the field.  
  
                                                 
2 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Free movement 
of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make a difference (COM(2013) 837 final). 
3 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems (OJ L 314, 7.6.2004, p. 1). 
4 The coordinating Regulations do not contain a general prohibition of fraud or abuse of rights. 
The Regulations mention fraud and abuse only once, in Recital 19 of Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009: “Procedures between institutions for mutual assistance in recovery of social security 
claims should be strengthened in order to ensure more effective recovery and smooth 
functioning of the coordination rules. Effective recovery is also a means of preventing and 
tackling abuses and fraud and a way of ensuring the sustainability of social security schemes”. 
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In this year’s report, dealing with reference year 2016, the following matters are 
covered: 
 first, the steps taken throughout the year to prevent and combat fraud and 
error in cases determined under the Regulations;  
 second, specific problems in implementing the coordination rules which may 
lead at least to risks of fraud and error;  
 third, agreements and bilateral cooperation agreements with other EU Member 
States entered into for the purposes of combating fraud and error;  
 fourth, the steps taken, in the field of benefits in kind, to promote compliance 
by institutions and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to 
provide information to citizens; 
 fifth, best practices, lessons learned, issues or concerns (including with regard 
to privacy and data protection) when dealing with cross-border cooperation and 
information exchange within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 
and (EC) No 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems; 
 sixth, examples of or proposals or suggestions for measures to improve the 
overall tackling of fraud and error in the field of social security coordination 
which National Contact Points (NCPs) can operationalise without the need for 
changes to national or EU law. 
 and finally, the quantitative data collected by HIVA by means of specific 
questions introduced in the thematic questionnaires. 
At the request of several Member States, the European Commission and the experts of 
the European Platform to combat cross-border social security fraud and error,5 the 
questionnaire which was revised in 2015 and 2016 was again revised for the 2017 
report after consultation with the European Commission and the Steering Committee 
of the European Platform to combat social security fraud and error. On the one hand, 
a question was added, namely question 6 on examples of or proposals or suggestions 
for measures to improve the overall tackling of fraud and error in the field of social 
security coordination which NCPs can operationalise without the need for changes to 
national or EU law. On the other hand, Member States were asked to update Annexes 
I and II of the report of 2016 and not to (re)draw country sheets on national 
legislation and bi or multilateral agreements between Member States. Last but not 
least, the question regarding quantitative data was dropped.  
Before 2015, figures on fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination 
were collected only for the EU provisions on unplanned necessary healthcare (by the 
so-called ‘EHIC Questionnaire’) as well as figures on the export of unemployment 
benefits (by the so-called ‘PD U2 Questionnaire’). The questionnaire on fraud and error 
launched in 2015 not only asked Member States to give an overview of steps taken at 
national level to combat fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination 
(by identifying existing good practices, problems or challenges and potential solutions) 
but also to provide quantitative data on fraud and error. Despite the low response rate 
among the Member States the same approach was applied last year.  
                                                 
5 The former H5NCP network. 
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For this year, a new approach to the collection of statistical information was agreed, as 
quantitative data were collected by the thematic questionnaires launched by HIVA 
within the framework of the Administrative Commission. The results were then 
integrated in the report by IRIS. 
This report summarises the information received for 2017 through the voluntary 
reporting by 25 Member States of the European Union, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; by three 
Member States of the European Economic Area, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway; and by Switzerland (hereinafter: the Member States). At the request of the 
European Commission, the authors of this report took a horizontal approach while 
writing this report and used their own judgment to identify interesting or innovative 
actions emerging from all replies to the questionnaire. Cross-cutting issues were 
identified and some conclusions and recommendations were drawn.  
Like previous years, a still growing interest in the subject of fraud and error can be 
recorded. Unfortunately, in general, it is at times still hard to tell whether the steps 
taken, reported in the country replies, refer to fraud and error in a cross-border 
context or in a strictly national context. Often, strictly internal measures, which are 
not targeted specifically at fraud and error in the framework of the coordination 
regulations or in a cross-border context in general, were reported. The authors of the 
national reports should be aware of the fact that it is the aim of this report to only 
report on fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination.  
Besides the aforementioned Ad-Hoc Group on fraud and error another Ad-Hoc Group 
on the exchange of personal data on fraud and error was set up at the 334th meeting 
of the AC on 19-20 June 2013. In accordance with its mandate this Ad-Hoc Group 
presented its report to the Administrative Commission on 18 December 2013. Certain 
legislative changes were recommended which, if adopted, would provide a clearer 
legal base for the exchange of data on fraud and error. In this respect it should be 
underlined that in the proposal for the revision of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 the 
Administrative Commission agreed to the creation of a legal base for data exchange 
which must be in line with the General Data Protection Regulation.6 In addition, in its 
proposal to modify Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009, published 
on 13 December 2016, the European Commission proposed to insert a legal base for 
data exchange, which shall be in line with the General Data Protection Regulation.7  
On 24 May 2016 the General Data Protection Regulation entered into force. The new 
rules, however, will apply in the Member States only as from 25 May 2018, by which 
time the Member States will have to adapt their national legislation and raise 
awareness among public authorities and companies of the new aspects introduced. 
The regulation constitutes an attempt to harmonise the privacy rules of the various 
States by defining a new common framework for all Member States of the European 
Union, on the processing of personal data.  
                                                 
6 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) OJ L 119/1 4.5.2016. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN. 
7 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 13 December 2016, COM(2016)815 final – 
2016/0397 (COD), 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=849&newsId=2699&furtherNews=yes. See in 
particular Articles 2.6 and 2.11. 
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2. STEPS TAKEN THROUGHOUT THE REFERENCE YEAR (2016) TO 
PREVENT AND COMBAT FRAUD AND ERROR IN CASES 
DETERMINED UNDER THE REGULATIONS 
Respondents were advised that for the purpose of this report “prevent” refers to pre-
emptive steps to reduce the risk of fraud or error occurring whereas “combat” refers 
to reactive steps taken to respond to concrete cases of fraud and error that have 
already materialised.  
The country reports by the Member States show that most of the Member States do 
not make a distinction between steps taken to combat/prevent fraud and steps taken 
to combat/prevent error. One of the reasons for the foregoing can be found in the fact 
that various Member States' national legislations do not make a distinction between 
fraud and error (see Annex I). Furthermore, it is often impossible to make a distinction 
between those steps in practice. When a Member State did make the distinction, it will 
be explicitly mentioned.  
Although Member States often reported that similar instruments, tools and processes 
are being used for preventing, as well as for combating fraud and error (CH, IS), 
hereinafter a distinction is made between steps taken to prevent and steps taken to 
combat fraud and error on the basis of logical reasoning. Please keep in mind that 
steps included in the combating section, can also have a preventive effect and vice 
versa.    
2.1. Steps taken to prevent fraud and error and the effect of 
those preventive steps 
The country replies to the questionnaire reveal that in 2016 the Member States of the 
European Union, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have taken a diversity of steps in 
order to prevent fraud and error in cases determined under the Regulation. What 
follows is an overview of the reported measures. A distinction is made between 
general steps, which are affecting all branches of social security horizontally, and 
specific steps per branch. A summary table of these general and specific steps can 
be found at the end of this section (p. 33). 
2.1.1. General steps taken to prevent fraud and error 
Regarding the reported general steps taken to prevent fraud and error, a distinction 
can be made between (1) general steps regarding information dissemination, (2) 
general steps regarding controlling and monitoring actions, (3) general steps 
regarding cooperation and data exchange, (4) general steps regarding Portable 
Documents (PDs), Structural Electronic Documents (SEDs) and other (E-)forms, and 
(5) other general steps.8    
2.1.1.1. General steps regarding information dissemination 
Various Member States (BG, CH, CZ, DK, ES, FI, LT, NL, PL) reported they took 
some general steps in the reference year 2016 to promote compliance by social 
security institutions and other parties involved with the coordination rules and to 
provide information to citizens, in order to prevent fraud and error. 
                                                 
8 For more information on official documents please visit the European Commission's website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=868http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=868  
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Concerning the information dissemination towards social security institutions and 
other parties involved, Spain stated that different channels of access to relevant 
information are established and are constantly updated, so that the Spanish 
institutions (Provincial Directorates) have the necessary information on the issues that 
give rise to most cases of uncertainty in terms of processing and resolution: 
instructions are produced for the Provincial Directorates, administrators are provided 
with constant support to enable them to clear up doubts on the application of 
Community law and information is published on the National Social Security Institute’s 
intranet site. Furthermore, an online messaging service has been incorporated in the 
ASIA computer application to report on all new additions and updates to the 
application, and it is available to all of the Institute's provincial and local offices for 
cross-border management of outgoing and incoming healthcare documents.  
 
A specific form of information dissemination towards institutions and other parties 
involved consists of training of the employers and employees as well as the clerks 
handling the cases (BG, CH, CZ, FI, NL, PL, UK). According to the Finnish Centre for 
pensions, due to those trainings, the employers are more aware of the coordination 
rules and try to abide by them in time. This makes the application of the rules easier 
for the administrations. The Central Compensation Office (Centrale de Compensation – 
CdC - CCO) of Switzerland reported that all staff members of the ‘benefits’ divisions 
of the CdC and medical staff working for the OAIE – almost 160 members of staff – 
attended awareness-raising workshops on insurance fraud. Administrations across the 
United Kingdom run a number of on-going initiatives to train front-line staff in 
healthcare to identify patients who should have an EHIC, S2, S1 or A1 and to correctly 
recognise and record these where appropriate. For example, they conduct 
presentations to National Health Service (NHS) staff, practitioner groups and circulate 
newsletters, posters and leaflets to raise awareness of potential NHS fraud risks, 
including overseas visitors. They also produced a video and developed a suite of e-
learning modules to train overseas visitors managers, finance and frontline staff 
(including administrators, clinicians and nurses). They also organised a series of 
workshop sessions aimed at improving staff understanding of the impact of fraud, 
whilst also informing them about legislation changes that may impact them.  
 
Even more specific, in November 2016 the “Conference on the grounds for EU 
citizens’ stay in Denmark – A Tool for Control?” was held for all 98 municipalities in 
Denmark. The purpose of the conference was to i) increase focus on the grounds for 
EU citizens' stay in Denmark and to ensure correct earnings and payments of social 
benefits, ii) create a forum for dialogue on EU citizens' stay and access to Danish 
social benefits and iii) to strengthen the cooperation among Danish authorities. The 
municipalities benefited greatly from the conference and felt better equipped to deal 
with EU citizens and their right to social benefits. 
In Poland, the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS) participated in the 
“Counselling Days”, which are regular meetings with the Polish community living in 
the EU/EFTA Member States and in countries with which Poland concluded an 
international agreement on social security – during the meetings experts from the 
Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Departament Rent 
Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) provided advice in individual cases and shared information 
about both the social security system in Poland and the rules of (EU or bilateral) 
social security coordination.  
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In addition to the information dissemination towards institutions and other parties 
involved, Member States also took steps concerning information dissemination 
towards citizens in order to prevent fraud and error. Information concerning the 
implementation of the coordination Regulations can e.g. be found on websites of 
competent institutions (FI, LT), in brochures (FI, PL) and in articles in local press 
(PL). When applying for a social security benefit, applicants are properly informed 
about their rights and obligations (LT, NL). Also mass communication measures like 
mass media campaigns are held in order to promote the general public’s awareness of 
the rules adherent to benefits (DK, LT, NL, PL).  
2.1.1.2. General steps regarding controlling and monitoring actions  
 
An extensive part of the reported steps taken to prevent fraud and error refers to 
controlling and monitoring actions. Various Member States (AT, IE, IT, NL, UK) 
mentioned they perform regular checks and monitoring activities, which can lead in 
individual cases to an investigation. The way these checks and monitoring activities 
are performed differ from Member State to Member State (e.g. concerning intensity, 
quantity, used sources/data and used systems).  
The National Institute of Social Security (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, 
INPS) of Italy implements data matching and data mining on its own databases by 
means of its own IT system which manages instances of fraud and error and the 
associated risk analysis. During 2016, further entries were made in the corresponding 
database, which increased the number of cases under examination. Also during 2016 
further implementations of the Unified Payments Control System (SCUP) were made 
by Italy. Specifically, as already reported in last year’s report, the SCUP blocks 
payments, on the basis of blacklists supplied by different sources (communication 
from the judicial authorities and the Central Directorate for Revenue and 
Contributions, risk scenarios from an anti-fraud platform, data checking at 
headquarters, communication from the Ministry of Justice) through matching with 
payments to be made. The system does not automatically block the tax number but 
selects relevant benefits and excludes non-relevant movements, e.g. social security 
contributions.  
The Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) (NL) stated they use a 
thematic approach to fraud detection. In addition to the back-office administrative 
(and electronic) controls and checks on forms, applications and personal client data by 
means of data matching, data mining and data exchange activities, during which a 
number of authentic electronic registers is used (e.g. registers on labour contracts, 
wages, income, benefits (Polis), in combination with the national citizenship database 
(BRP) with addresses, civil service numbers, data of birth, and so forth), they also use 
statistical means of risk profiling, risk management and risk targeting in combination 
with checklists for front-office officials such as work coaches, doctors and 
intermediaries. Furthermore, they perform electronic payment controls and they made 
available a central fraud (anonymous) hotline and facilities to report via internet, call-
centre or mail. 
Ireland stated to have a broad-ranging and comprehensive control strategy where 
fraud control measures are implemented as part of the normal claims processing 
procedures, since to them there is no contradiction between exercising fraud control 
and delivering good customer service. The fraud control process is an integral part of 
their Department’s day-to-day operations. The various control measures ensure that 
the objectives of prevention, detection, deterrence and debt recovery are achieved.  
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Concerning the investigations and inspections in individual cases, Italy and Finland 
mentioned the need for intra-national cooperation between institutions for social 
security and other national institutions, like tax authorities and police authorities (see 
infra). The Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) (NL) reported that 
in addition to investigations and inspections, also home visits of clients are performed.  
2.1.1.3. General steps regarding cooperation and data exchange 
Ireland mentioned correctly that the prevention and detection of fraud and error is 
and will remain resource intensive (referring to available manpower and data). 
Intranational and international cooperation, as well as intranational and international 
data exchange can resolve this resource problem and help the Member States to 
prevent and detect fraud and error.  
Starting with the intranational cooperation and data exchange, various Member States 
reported on steps taken during the reference year 2016: 
Cooperation between national authorities directly involved in combating and 
preventing fraud and error continued to be a priority in Denmark. The formalised, 
organised as well as ad hoc cooperation with municipalities, governmental agencies 
and ministries is prioritised because it has been observed that coordination and 
cooperation vastly enlarges the possibility of identifying patterns of fraudulent or 
erroneous behaviour in individual cases or in bigger cohorts of beneficiaries. In 
particular, Udbetaling Danmark is enjoying a close cooperation in several forums with 
Local Government Denmark (KL), who represents all 98 municipalities. 
In Finland, the cooperation between Finnish authorities, mainly between the Finnish 
Tax Administration (taxes), the Regional State Administrative Agency (occupational 
safety and the Act on the Contractor’s Obligations and Liability when Work is 
Contracted Out) and the Finnish Centre for Pensions (ETK, pension insurance, A1 
certificates) has been found to have a preventive effect during the reference year 
2016. The institutions have worked together and made inspections, e.g. at 
construction sites in Finland. 
The Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) (NL) participated in joined, 
multidisciplinary intervention teams, together with Tax and Customs Administration, 
municipalities, Social Insurance Bank, National Police and other institutions. They also 
performed internet research on fraud phenomena and fraud-related cases, in 
cooperation with National Police, Tax and Customs Administrations, universities, and 
other institutions. 
Belgium reported that as regards cooperation between Public Social Security 
Institutions (IPSS), a system of electronic data flows from authentic sources 
coordinated by the Crossroads Bank for Social Security was developed so that each 
IPSS that grants social security benefits depending on the social and professional 
situation of the insured can automatically obtain the information they require to 
manage the file correctly. Each IPSS may thus be authorised by the Social Security 
Sectoral Committee to benefit from access, free of charge, to the data which are 
relevant to it and are legally justified. 
The Croatian Employment Service (HR) has established systems of data exchange 
with several other relevant institutions (e.g. the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute, 
the Central Registry of Affiliates). 
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The United Kingdom reported that specialist intelligence and statistics teams 
collaborate on a range of initiatives that centre on the analysis, prioritisation and 
progression of fraud-related allegations. The purpose is to develop an intelligence-led 
capability, working together across the public sector and external organisations to 
share information, identify risks and develop proactive, joined-up approaches to 
countering fraud. That work includes: 
 Fraud Risk Assessment – Where information from customers is systematically 
gathered and analysed and a statistically based risk assessment of their 
vulnerability to fraud. 
 Intelligence Alerts – Where received information about the latest methods 
being used by organised groups to commit fraud-related crime is shared with 
partners and provides counter fraud avoidance advice and guidance, where 
appropriate. 
In Lithuania, meetings with competent institution specialists were organised to 
discuss individual cases and share best practise, e.g. to ensure uniform application 
and interpretation of coordination rules between territorial divisions of the competent 
institutions. On 1 October 2015 the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) introduced 
a new IT system for the issuance of entitlement documents and invoices in order to 
improve and facilitate the revision of the data and to speed up the process of 
exchanging information between the competent authorities. In 2016 some variations 
and developments were performed to improve the operation of that IT system and 
avoid human errors. 
The Member States also took some steps to improve the international cooperation and 
data exchange: 
To prevent fraud, the National Agency for Payments and Social Benefits (NAPSB) of 
Romania cooperated with institutions from France and Ireland that reported 
suspected cases. In order to prevent error, the NAPSB requested necessary 
information from the institutions from other Member States before approving the 
payment.  
 
Finland reported that the cooperation between different authorities and institutions in 
Finland and outside Finland is ongoing and functioning well. The Finnish Centre for 
Pensions is active in the meetings organised between the Nordic institutions as well as 
other neighbouring countries. This gives a chance to exchange information about the 
Finnish system and interpretations as well as meet colleagues. 
Some Member States even created a specialised unit/team to further develop the 
international cooperation and data exchange. In Denmark, the unit for “International 
Fraud and Error Information”, established under the auspices of Udbetaling Danmark 
(DK) in 2015, kept working to establish close relations both to other Member States 
as well as to countries outside the EU/EEA area, aiming at enhancing cooperation and 
information exchange. The Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) 
(NL) carried out international data sharing and controls of clients who live abroad by 
a cross-border enforcement team. 
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Belgium cited that in 2016, the government has promoted the conclusion of 
partnership agreements (for prevention) with social partners in specific sectors. Under 
these partnership agreements, the signatories may in particular undertake to raise 
awareness among their European sister organisations of the issue of unfair 
competition linked to employment and remuneration conditions. Partnership 
agreements have already been signed in the construction, meat, taxi and funeral 
undertaking sectors. The aim is to also sign partnership agreements in other sectors 
susceptible to fraud (agriculture and horticulture).  
To prevent payment of social pensions, benefits etc to deceased persons, Latvia has 
signed bilateral agreements with other EU Member States on the exchange of 
information on pension receivers electronically. For example the Agreement between 
the National Social Insurance Board of the Republic of Estonia and State Social 
Insurance Agency of the Republic of Latvia on exchange of information on pension 
receivers in electronic form was signed on 14 January 2016.  
Poland reported that the outcome of monthly electronic exchange of information 
about deaths of Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, 
Departament Rent Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) beneficiaries in the year 2016 is as 
follows:  
 concerning ZUS beneficiaries residing in Germany (24,083), the electronic 
exchange of information resulted in savings worth over € 560,000, which is an 
amount of benefits which were not overpaid because of 310 identified deaths in 
the reference year;  
 concerning ZUS beneficiaries residing in Sweden (4,781), the electronic 
exchange of information resulted in savings worth over € 19,000, which is an 
amount of benefits which were not overpaid because of 45 identified deaths in 
the reference year; 
 concerning ZUS beneficiaries residing in Croatia (113), the electronic exchange 
of information was introduced and there was no reported death in the reference 
year;  
 concerning ZUS beneficiaries residing in the United Kingdom (2,600), the 
electronic exchange of information resulted in savings worth over € 2,100, 
which is an amount of benefits which were not overpaid because of 17 
identified deaths in the reference year.  
Lastly, Poland reported on its positive experiences with the European Platform to 
combat cross-border social security fraud and error and noted its own activity within 
the Platform, as well as the activities of the Platform in general, e.g. the sharing of 
good practices which may limit the volume of cases of non-effective recovery of 
overpayments.  
2.1.1.4. General steps regarding PDs, SEDs and other (E-)forms  
Related to international cooperation and information exchange, as well as to checks 
and monitoring activities, some Member States also took steps concerning Portable 
Documents (PDs), Structured Electronic Documents (SEDs), E-forms and other 
documents: 
Austria reported that in some cases, when inter-State forms are issued, they have a 
serial reference number and/or the official signature of the institution concerned. 
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In order to prevent error, the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) (EE) makes sure 
that documents are drawn up properly and contain the necessary information. In case 
of suspicion, the UIF contacts the source for a double check. To prevent fraud, the UIF 
makes sure that every document is properly signed and stamped (if needed). In case 
of suspicion, the UIF checks the document and contacts the source. The steps taken 
are effective, since no fraud or error cases were identified. 
Also in Lithuania, specialists of the competent institutions verify information provided 
in SEDs, PDs, E-forms or other documents. It is always checked if documents are 
properly filled and signed. In case of suspicion as to the credibility of the presented 
information, the EU Member State’s relevant competent institution is contacted. 
Lithuanian competent institutions also check information about the employer or person 
concerned available from different registers and other institutions’ databases (e.g. tax 
authority, register of Lithuanian residents). For the issuing of some PDs and SEDs, the 
Lithuanian competent institutions use an electronic application. When the information 
in the document is partly filled out by computerised procedure from electronic 
databases, missing data are completed by hand. 
Finland reported that the processes in handling the A1 applications have been 
scrutinised and improvements have been made in order to decrease the number of 
errors and to issue the certificates more efficiently. The Finnish Centre for Pensions 
has many electronic databases which can be used when processing the applications. 
The Finnish Centre for Pensions also registers the A1 certificates issued abroad and 
assists when other Finnish authorities have questions concerning foreign workers, 
their A1 certificates or the lack of certificates.  
2.1.1.5. Other general steps taken to prevent fraud and error 
In order to improve the prevention of fraud and error, Italy has set up a new 
electronic application for social benefits in the course of 2016. From now on, it is 
necessary to amend and supplement the electronic application for social benefits by 
including the applicant’s declarations of civil status and of income abroad. The 
following sworn statements for EU citizens were included in the application for social 
benefits: 
 residence entry in the population register; 
 the requirements laid down in Article 7 of Legislative Decree 30/2007, namely 
to be in paid employment or self-employment in Italy and to have sufficient 
financial means for themselves and their family in order not to become a 
burden on the social security system of the host Member State during their 
stay. 
The Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) (NL) has simplified its 
procedures and regulations in order to reduce the administrative burden for clients 
and thereby prevent error. 
Lastly, the United Kingdom reported on a system of continuous review of practices, 
monitoring and evaluating outcomes to enhance and develop pre-emptive and re-
active processes. 
2.1.2. Specific steps taken to prevent fraud and error 
In addition to the abovementioned general steps, specific measures were taken in 
particular branches of social security. 
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2.1.2.1. Applicable legislation 
(a) Specific information dissemination 
In the field of applicable legislation, in order to prevent fraud and error, a few Member 
States (CY, HU, PL) took some steps concerning information dissemination.  
In 2016 the Social Insurance Services of Cyprus continued the practice of arranging 
meetings with prospective employers, as well as with lawyers and accountants in 
order to inform them of the provisions of the regulations in respect of applicable 
legislation. In Poland, within the scope of the competencies of the Social Insurance 
Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Departament Rent Zagranicznych – ZUS 
DRZ), information leaflets are available on the website and in the customer service 
rooms of ZUS. Moreover, training is provided for clients and ZUS employees. To 
prevent fraud, the NIHIF in Hungary reported that related to applicable legislation 
two information/campaign days were organised to present best practices (for the 
representatives, clerks of county government offices). To prevent error, the NIHIF 
dedicated two technical workshops to provide information about newest IT 
developments and to provide assistance for using the new IT system applications 
(target organisations: competent institutions) in connection with applicable legislation. 
(b) Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
A couple of Member States reported some specific controlling and monitoring actions 
regarding applicable legislation with the aim of preventing fraud and error. 
Italy first explained their procedure for combating fictitious employment in order to 
obtain social security benefits. The close cooperation between the services of the INPS 
has made it possible to effectively combat fraud involving fictitious jobs created solely 
in order to receive undue social security benefits to the detriment of the INPS’s 
revenue. Contributions are paid for positions with no economic activity where no work 
is carried out, with the sole intention to obtain social security/welfare benefits for 
those fictitious workers. Alerts by the territorial structures and the intelligence 
activities carried out at central level in the course of 2016 have found some 19,000 
fictitious workers, leading to 440 companies, with estimated savings for the INPS of 
about € 150 million in benefits not granted.  For these positions, checks carried out 
centrally aimed primarily at keeping on stand-by the contribution statements of 
fictitious workers and thus limiting the access to benefits and at immediately reporting 
cases of fraud to inspection services for subsequent inquiries in order to cancel the 
fictitious employment. Experience and methodical data analysis made it possible to 
seamlessly structure and update risk indicators to take account of developments in the 
phenomenon, intended to promote the identification of the jobs/employers concerned 
and standardise the administrative controls in order to enable the adoption of 
measures for the suspension of contributions to the individual insurance account.  
Secondly, Italy reported on the control of contribution statements. The recent 
emergence of offences of fictitious employment revealed a pathological process 
involving information flows that are retroactive and in any event after the cessation of 
the employment relationship, designed to obtain the contributions necessary for the 
payment of the benefits. In order to facilitate the development of schemes to 
maximise the potential for finding misconduct involving manifest fraud, it was 
considered necessary to deploy procedural systems with a maximum level of 
automation for control of information flows designed to create ex post individual 
positions or to cancel others that have been transmitted previously. In the first case, 
the risk to be avoided is the massive flow of information that is fraudulently designed 
to create, in a person's statement of account, the necessary contribution for the 
payment of benefits. In the second case, the obvious risk is that, after proper 
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payment of benefits, the company sends a cancellation, thus creating a credit, without 
any form of alert being sent for the recovery of undue payments. The new control 
system and monitoring is based on automated measures taking account of the specific 
characteristics of the individual case: 
1) The deployment of a procedural system which permits regularisation only after 
the online transmission of all relevant supporting documents (e.g. copy of the 
Libro Unico del Lavoro (employee logbook) and a copy of the employment 
contract concluded with the employee), in order to prevent statements of 
account for workers from being updated without a reply from the Institute. 
2) Introduction of a procedural system designed to intercept contribution 
statements concerning potentially time-barred periods, preventing the update of 
the individual position of workers: updating of the statement of account can 
only be made after the INPS recognises the applicability of necessary acts 
interrupting the time bar.  
3) A procedural system is being deployed to refer each contribution statement to 
the INPS for specific substantive review, based on a simulated calculation to 
attribute the contributions required to meet the requirement for NASPI: the 
statement will be updated only after that control. 
4) Ex post controls: given that UniEmens regularisation may also refer to 
reductions or eliminations of taxable contributions previously reported, and that 
such contributions may have led to payment of benefits, a procedural system is 
being finalised which examines the impact of such regularisation as regards the 
right to, or the measurement of, income support benefits already paid, in order 
to initiate the recovery of undue payments. 
Furthermore, given that the social insurance relationship is a three-party relationship 
involving the employee/insured person, the employer and the social security 
institution/insurer, or a two-party relationship in case of self-employment, and that, 
under the current system, changes made by the enterprise and sent to the Institute 
are not communicated directly to the person concerned, it was considered necessary, 
given the changes reducing taxable contributions, to inform the worker of the effect 
that such a change has on their insurance account. This will result in greater 
transparency and potential indirect control on the part of the employee/self-
employed/insured person as a party to the social insurance relationship. These 
features will be present in the next version. 
 
(c) Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange 
In order to prevent fraud and error in the field of applicable legislation, a close link has 
been made between the central offices and the district offices of Cyprus and an 
exchange of information on registration of new employers with employees in other 
Member States has been set up.  
Romania reported that the Directorate for International Relations within the National 
House of Public Pensions (Casa Nationala de Pensii Publici, CNPP), as the competent 
institution, continued the collaboration with similar institutions from other Member 
States in order to combat undeclared work, through the exchange of relevant 
Lastly, the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, 
Departament Rent Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) of Poland reported that in relation to 
prevent both fraud and error in cases determined under the Regulations, the central 
register of issued PDs A1 has been launched in the year 2016. 
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information (e.g. with Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands), as well as with 
the Romanian National Tax Administration Agency, within the Ministry of Public 
Finance and with the Labour Inspection/Territorial Labour Inspectorates, through the 
exchange of concrete information/annual databases, in order to verify the compliance 
by the Romanian companies which provide temporary personnel on the territory of 
other Member States with the conditions imposed by the relevant European 
legislation. These steps led to uniformity of applying the provisions of European 
Regulations and a faster solving of the beneficiaries’ request. 
(d) Other specific steps 
 
2.1.2.2. Old-age and survivor’s benefits  
(a) Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
Concerning old-age and survivor’s benefits, an extensive part of the reported steps 
taken to prevent fraud and error relates to specific controlling and monitoring actions.  
In 2016, a lot of Member States continued the practice of requiring an annual life 
certificate from recipients of old-age or survivor’s benefits living in another (Member) 
State in order to verify whether these persons are still alive and thus entitled to those 
benefits. (AT, CH, CY, DE, DK, LT, MT, NO, PL, RO, SK). Romania reported that on 
top of such a life certificate, also a declaration of honour, provided for in the internal 
implementation of instructions of European regulations provisions, has to be filled in 
and returned to the territorial pension houses, in order to prevent the creation of 
different pension dossiers relating to the same beneficiary. In the Czech Republic, 
where it is currently necessary to submit a life certificate as often as the benefit shall 
be paid, a debate to amend the relevant national legislation was started in 2016. 
According to this amendment it should be possible to submit a life certificate only once 
a year if the social security institutions agreed on the electronic exchange of necessary 
information to verify whether the entitled person living abroad is still alive.  
During 2016, the Suisse Central Compensation Office (Centrale de Compensation – 
CdC - CCO) performed different kinds of control procedures in order to verify the life 
status and civil status of pensioners and their family members residing abroad who 
are receiving benefits. The standard control procedure involved sending a standard 
letter with a barcode and reply envelope (CERVIE) inviting some 700,000 pensioners 
to certify their life status with a qualified authority. If there was no reaction within 90 
days, the payment of benefits was immediately suspended until the case had been 
clarified. One-off controls were also carried out on pre-determined ‘risk groups’ (such 
as old-age and survivor’s insurance (OASI) pensioners over the age of 100) or at 
random (e.g. risk mitigation along the lines of the internal control system). The 
assistance of foreign insurance systems and of representatives of the DFAE in the 
countries concerned was thus required for this purpose. Among the usable results of 
the different checks carried out during the reference year, ordinary checks on life 
certificates uncovered attempts to defraud the OASI in Spain (approx. CHF 90,000 
misappropriated), Italy (approx. CHF 70,000 misappropriated), in the USA (approx. 
CHF 25,000 misappropriated) and in Malaysia (attempts thwarted), which gave rise to 
the start of legal proceedings involving the authorities and financial partners. 
Hungary specifically reported that in order to prevent fraud and error in the field of 
applicable legislation, the NIHIF was involved in the legislative work related to 
changes in national legislation concerning the issuance of A1 certificates (applicable 
from 1 January 2017, to strengthen rules for avoiding replacement of posted workers 
and for examining the substantial activity of the sending company).  
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Extraordinary controls on Swiss nationals resident abroad and over the age of 100 
uncovered one act of fraud in Argentina (approx. CHF 100,000 misappropriated) while 
a one-off check of 338 beneficiaries born before 1916 resulted in investigations which, 
in two cases, led to criminal charges being brought. Lastly, a random check involving 
7,791 life certificates uncovered only 39 instances of non-compliance. To conclude, it 
can be noted that the Anti-Fraud Department of the DI (OAIE) reduced or stopped 27 
pensions (source: 7 checklists, 14 complaints and 6 doubtful cases). This saved the 
insurance fund 6.2 million in pension costs.  
Germany combines the life certificate method with automated cross-checking of 
registered deaths. The German pensions authority (Deutsche Rentenversicherung) has 
given the pensions service of Deutsche Post AG the task of carrying out regular 
automated cross-checking of registered deaths with various EU Member States and 
third countries.  
   
 
820.000 
97% 
25.700 
3% 
2014: Automatic death data 
cross-checks (DE) covered 
845 700 active pension 
payments in AT, BE, CH, ES, 
FI, IS, IT, LU, NL and SE 
Approximate amount of life certificates that did
not have to be sent, as these persons were
covered by the automatic cross-checks of death
data
864.100 
96% 
34.400 
4% 
2015: Automatic death data 
cross-checks (DE) covered 
898 500 active pension 
payments in AT, BE, CH, ES, 
FI, IS, IT, LU, NL and SE 
Approximate amount of life certificates that did
not have to be sent, as these persons were
covered by the automatic cross-checks of death
data
Approximate amount of life certificates that had
to be sent, as these persons were not covered by
the automatic cross-checks of death data
867.700 
96% 
35.800 
4% 
2016: Automatic death data 
cross-checks (DE) covered 
903 500 active pension 
payments in AT, BE, CH, ES, 
FI, IL, IT, LU, NL, PL and SE 
Approximate amount of life certificates that did
not have to be sent, as these persons were
covered by the automatic cross-checks of death
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24 
 
In Italy, it is up to the provider of payment services to verify whether pensioners 
residing abroad are still alive. The current service provider is Citibank, NA. Under the 
contract governing the service, the bank, in fulfilment of the obligation to ensure the 
regularity of payments, is required to verify that the pensioner is still alive when the 
first pension payment is made and, annually, to conduct a general verification that all 
pension recipients are still alive. 
The general verification is based on: 
1. a request from the bank for confirmation from a 'credible witness', i.e. from a 
member of staff of a diplomatic representation of Italy or a public authority of 
the country of residence of pensioners to verify that they are still alive (for 
pensioners admitted to nursing or retirement homes the confirmation may be 
issued by the person responsible for the structure, for prisoners by the director 
of the prison, for persons who are house-bound due to health problems by the 
patient’s doctor). The original copy of this certificate must be sent to Citibank 
by post, or electronically via a specially designed web portal where: 
a) officials of diplomatic representations of Italy and representatives of 
workers' social assistance bodies that in some countries, including the UK, 
also have the status of a civil servant can prove that a person is alive using 
the online platform made available by Citibank; 
b) operators authorised by workers' social assistance bodies may upload 
electronic copies of the forms or confirmations that a person is alive and 
supporting documents, duly completed and signed, as appropriate, directly 
to the Citibank IT system, avoiding sending them by post. 
2. the payment of one or more pension instalments via a local operator ('support 
partner'), for personal collection by the pensioner: the payment is usually 
made via a Western Union outlet. 
The various confirmation systems are used in conjunction with each other so as to 
limit the inconvenience for pensioners and guarantee the effectiveness of the 
procedure. In order to avoid uncertainty about how to provide proof of life, pensioners 
are sent a letter which clearly sets out in detail what they need to do and the 
authorities to contact.  
This verification system has made it possible to limit, to a certain extent, the risk of 
payments being made to parties other than the proper beneficiary: the payment of 
52,318 pensions abroad in the last five years has been suspended. In 2016 the 
payment of 10,227 pensions abroad of an average of € 405 was suspended, 
amounting to estimated savings worth € 2,070,968. However, this form of verification 
is restricted by the fact that this control is only carried out once a year. For this 
reason, the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) is always seeking 
additional control tools. 
Also in Italy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been implementing a procedure for 
the transmission of information about the death of pensioners residing abroad since 
the end of 2012. Pending the development of IT applications allowing the transmission 
of data in real time, all death notices regarding pensioners registered by consulates 
abroad are being collected on a two-monthly basis. This allowed the INPS to remove 
around 2,800 pensions from the books in 2016 on the grounds of the death of the 
recipient. Furthermore, a specific agreement has been concluded between the Istituto 
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS, National Institute of Social Security, NISS) 
and the Ministry of the Interior to regulate the former's real-time access – by way of a 
system of application integration – to information in the national population registers.  
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Also further initiatives based on partnerships with public institutions and workers' 
social assistance bodies have been developed in order to facilitate the acquisition of 
information on deaths by the INPS. 
In addition to procedures in order to verify whether a beneficiary residing abroad is 
still alive, Member States also reported on control systems with other objectives.  
Denmark reported that random checks of old-age pensioners and early retirement 
pensioners living in two Member States in 2016. They were asked to document 
residence, marital status and income by providing their annual tax return of 2015 from 
their respective tax authority. The inspection is still ongoing, so conclusions are 
expected later this year. A significant step in the prevention of errors was achieved 
when a new procedure was implemented by law in Udbetaling Danmark back in 2015 
within the areas of old-age pension and anticipatory pension. With this legislative 
change, the procedure of adjusting pension rates to match the level of income for the 
beneficiary was restructured from a yearly check-up to an automatic monthly check-
up on the basis of the Danish National Income Registry (eIndkomst). Thus, the 
pension rates are adjusted automatically each month rather than yearly to the 
advantage of both the claimants as well as Udbetaling Danmark. With this procedure, 
the built-up of large amounts due for recovery is to a significant extent avoided. It 
should be emphasised that the cases of recovery in this respect are not to be 
understood as an evidence of fraud, but rather illustrate errors made by the claimants 
who may not have been aware of their obligations to inform about changes in 
circumstances on a continuous basis. With the new procedure, the rates are adjusted 
automatically on a monthly basis, hence eliminating a significant source of error. 
However, the new procedure also results in cases of fraud being detected at an earlier 
stage. 
The Czech Republic stated that for the purpose of checking facts or data which have 
impact on the entitlement to benefits and continuation of payments, central databases 
of the Ministry of the Interior are used. 
In order to prevent fraud and error, the CANPI of Hungary relies on its special 
decision-making procedure. It is a double decision-making procedure (on separate 
clerk and revision levels) which is complemented – when necessary – with additional 
(supervisor and leader) levels. This multiple level system in most cases is sufficient to 
filter false statements, also to avoid fraud and error. 
In order to prevent fraud and error, in 2016 the Social Insurance Agency (SIA) of 
Slovakia checked the legitimacy of pension proceedings. Based on the results of the 
checks, shortcomings were resolved and consequences followed against case handlers 
in charge. Aiming at the prevention of fraud and error, the international pension 
agenda is secured by two civil servants (the case handler and the senior case handler 
who checks and approves the correctness of actions), the pension amount is 
determined by automated equipment which has various built-in control mechanisms 
and the transfer of foreign pensions is computerised (payment orders are created and 
checked monthly after verifying the correctness of the details about the bank account 
holder abroad and after verifying SWIFT and BIC codes). Pensions in cash are remitted 
via cheques of the Deutsche Bank, of which the validity is unlimited, and they are paid 
only to authorised persons.  
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(b) Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange 
In the field of old-age and survivor’s benefits, also specific steps regarding cooperation 
and data exchange in order to prevent fraud and error were taken by different 
Member States.   
Concerning cooperation, several Member States reported on requests of verification 
sent to the competent institutions of other Member States (CY).  
Some Member States concluded agreements on the exchange of data on deaths (and 
in some cases on pension amounts) with other Member States (AT, IT, PL). The 
Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS, National Institute of Social Security, 
NISS) of Italy has concluded agreements with the social security institutions of 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and currently regularly exchanges data 
electronically through the mutual transmission of requests and responses. Agreements 
with Great Britain and the Netherlands have already been signed and preliminary tests 
for the exchange of data are currently underway. The INPS is also conducting 
negotiations with institutions in various countries such as France, Luxembourg and 
Poland with a view to concluding similar agreements. The aim of these technical and 
procedural agreements is for the institutions involved to endeavour to harmonise their 
files relating to common clients and, in order to avoid undue benefit payments due to 
the possible death of recipients, to exchange the personal data of recipients in order to 
compare and harmonise the data on deaths available in their archives and take the 
necessary action. Through exchanges of information with other EU countries, it was 
possible in 2016 to discontinue some 878 pensions paid to persons resident in 
Germany on the grounds of the death of the recipient, and around 858 pensions paid 
to persons resident in Switzerland.  
The Netherlands reported that the Social Insurance Bank (Socialeverzekeringsbank 
– SVB) gives high priority to creating electronic data exchanges with regard to deaths 
of its clients in other countries, since this kind of data exchange prevents fraud and 
error and also reduces the administrative burden on clients to supply annual life 
certificates. In their view, the process of creating electronic data exchanges is 
advancing slowly.  
Poland stated that in 2016, the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS) continued 
its work related to making an agreement with the German institution Deutsche Post 
AG Renten Service, on obtaining data from this institution on deaths of old-age and 
disability pensioners of KRUS residing in Germany. Currently, works aimed at making 
this agreement are being completed. Since 2014 KRUS has been using the European 
Online Information System of German Old-Age and Disability Insurance (EOA), which 
makes it possible to verify the correctness of payment. Moreover, it is also applied to 
conduct audits in order to check the correctness of granting the already paid old-age 
and disability benefits, verify beneficiaries’ address details, check life and residence of 
beneficiaries residing in Germany and obtain information on persons registered in the 
German system who are at the same time subject to farmers’ social insurance. Thus, 
it is possible to avoid overpayment of farmers’ old-age and disability benefits. The 
Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Departament Rent 
Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) also continued the exchange with Sweden, signed an 
Lastly, in order to prevent fraud and error, in the field of competencies of the Social 
Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Departament Rent 
Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) of Poland identified cases of error or fraud were analysed 
to avoid them in the future, but no figures with breakdown into cases of fraud and 
error are available for the year 2016. 
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agreement with the UK and started the exchange with Croatia and the UK. Works are 
ongoing to conclude agreements with the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain and Italy and 
initial talks were undertaken with other countries.  
Portugal mentioned that their Institute of Social Security is conducting a study on the 
possibility of electronic data exchange to prevent undue payments of benefits, 
following contacts with other Member States (DE, FR and LU). Lastly, Romania 
explicitly stated that it did not conclude agreements and arrangements with other 
Member States for the purpose of communicating information related to the death of 
pensioners. 
In addition, agreements concerning the exchange of data on deaths, Italy reported 
that for many years, the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS, National 
Institute of Social Security, NISS) has been managing pension claims based on the 
accumulation of periods abroad by means of an application known as Stazione di 
lavoro CI (CI Workstation). The new version of this application allows for more 
efficient information exchanges between the various applications and archives of the 
Institute, leads to a reduction in data entry activity, historical processing of 
information and a significant reduction in the use of paper communication between 
offices, enhancing the transparency, security and traceability of work processes. In 
order to make the examination of forms received from foreign States or other actors 
more traceable, a procedure has been developed which allows for the monitoring of 
operational activities with respect to flows of international exchanges of information in 
the sector of pensions and income support benefits, known as MOFE (Monitoring of 
Forms from Abroad), via the computerised registration and scanning of documents. 
The procedural and administrative analyses of the implementation of the procedure 
were launched in 2016. In particular, of the possibility is provided for to perform data 
matching of personal data of applicants for income support benefits, including family 
members of the household for the relevant benefits, with the information in the INPS 
population register (ARCA). The project, which is currently being developed, will make 
it possible to establish whether an applicant for these benefits is insured at the INPS 
and to check their correct address and family members in order to recognise their 
legitimate right to receive those benefits.  
Lastly, Poland reported direct meetings with the representatives of liaison institutions 
from other EU/EFTA Member States to exchange information concerning changes in 
national legislation or institutional structure, contact details of persons indicated in 
each institution for the purpose of direct contact in questionable cases, as well as to 
resolve legal or procedural (bilateral) issues.  
2.1.2.3. Healthcare and sickness benefits in kind  
(a) Specific information dissemination  
Also in the area of healthcare and sickness benefits in kind, a number of Member 
States (CH, DE, ES, LT) took steps concerning information dissemination in order to 
prevent fraud and error.  
The first part of these steps consists of training the staff of health insurance 
institutions and other parties involved (CH, DE). In Germany, the information 
provided to healthcare providers on the DVKA's website and elsewhere has also been 
expanded.  
Other reported steps relate to information dissemination towards the citizens. In 
Germany, information sheets for those seeking treatment in Germany are available 
on the internet, free of charge, in the most widely used languages. In order to prevent 
cases of the inappropriate use of the EHIC, the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
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of Lithuania informs its citizens about the sanctions related to such inappropriate 
use. In Spain, to prevent fraud in cases determined under the Regulations, citizens 
are still informed about the use of the EHIC through information campaigns on the 
EHIC, which were disseminated and updated via the Spanish social security website 
(www.seg-social.es) and through information sheets issued to insured parties 
alongside the EHIC. Spain has observed an increase in the number of insured persons 
who, after a change to their personal or employment situation, are seeking 
information on the continued validity of the EHIC obtained before the change to their 
circumstances to avoid any potential economic liability for undue use of the EHIC. 
They have also noted greater autonomy on the part of the Spanish institutions in 
terms of management and processing of healthcare under EU regulations, resulting 
from the dissemination of updated information in this regard. 
(b) Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
Various Member States (BE, CH, EE, HU, MT, NL, PL) reported specific controlling 
and monitoring actions to prevent fraud and error in the field of healthcare and 
sickness benefits in kind.  
The data of electronically transmitted invoices from the healthcare providers are for 
example automatically, electronically checked (CH, EE). Estonia thereby emphasised 
that while implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 the insured person’s personal 
data is processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act. There are certain 
restrictions to accessing and processing a person’s personal data in the EHIF. Only 
specialists who are engaged in dealing with e-forms and implementing Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 have access to the information and not even all of them have the same 
data available, only the part they need for their work.  
 
A last example can be found in Belgium, where Belgian sickness funds are 
responsible for preventive actions, like annual questionnaires on the changes in the 
situation of persons that can have an impact on social benefits. 
Some Member States (DE, MT, SK) mentioned that in cases of difficulties, an 
improved cooperation with institutions and other parties involved of other Member 
States led to the prevention of fraud and/or error.  
(c) Specific preventive measures 
Lastly, Member States (CH, EE, LT) reported on specific preventive measures in the 
field of healthcare and sickness benefits in kind. 
Switzerland stated that in order to prevent fraud and error, about 90% of their 
invoices are directly paid to the medical institutions, physicians etc and only 10% to 
the patient. In addition, payments are never done by cheque or in cash. They pay only 
– without exceptions – via bank or post accounts. 
Another example can be found in Malta, where the competent (health) institution has 
increased its payments verification process sample to 100% with the ultimate aim of 
preventing fraud and error. The increase in the payments verification process, from a 
sample based on a 100% verification effectively meant a substantial increase in the 
payment process; such a procedure promoted better management and led to bilateral 
agreement of queried claims.   
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In Lithuania, the Minister of Health of the Republic of Lithuania has approved the 
Sectoral Programme for Prevention of Corruption in the Health System for 2015-2019 
by the order of the Minister of Health No V-1433 of 10 December 2015. Seeking to 
reduce the level of corruption in the health sector it was intended to improve the 
anticorruption evaluation of the drafts of the legal acts, the publicity of public and 
administrative services and decision-making, and the publicity of procedures at the 
healthcare institutions. 
The Czech Republic stated that no preventive measures were introduced in 2016 
since no cases of fraud and/or error were observed in the field of healthcare and 
sickness benefits in kind. 
2.1.2.4. Social and invalidity benefits 
Only Hungary and Italy reported on steps taken in order to prevent fraud and/or error 
in the field of social and invalidity benefits. 
In Hungary, to prevent fraud, the NORSA maintained its practice of asking 
information about the benefits paid by other Member States. In case of need for 
further clarification or verification, the NORSA reaches the competent institution of the 
other Member State requiring the clarification of the individual and particular situation 
as well as the verification of any facts and/or events relevant to applying national 
legislation.  
In every single case relevant information was double-checked. Additionally, in the 
course of the granting procedure, all claimants are informed in writing by the NORSA 
of the consequences set forth by law, if any information relevant to the award of the 
benefit – which the claimant is aware of – is not reported to the competent institution. 
The final decision taken on the claim clearly describes the roles and responsibilities of 
the beneficiaries in combating and preventing errors, as well as the legal and financial 
consequences they have to face in case of failing to comply with their obligation of 
cooperating with the authorities. The NORSA (invalidity benefits) stated that the 
number of overpaid and undue benefits could be further diminished. 
2.1.2.5. Family benefits  
In the area of family benefits, to prevent fraud, the CANPI of Hungary maintained its 
enhanced measures to appropriately inform persons concerned about their reporting 
duties (especially on the actual Member State of residence for minor children, and also 
on any changes related to the employment status of the person concerned, or that of 
his or her consort/partner). Slovakia reported that its national legislation establishes 
the reporting obligation on the facts and circumstances that are relevant for payment 
of family allowances. On the basis of forms and letters from foreign institutions, 
specific cases are investigated in accordance with the coordination Regulations. 
Payment of family allowances in case of Member State citizens immigrating to or 
residing in Slovakia is investigated in EU Member States. In duly justified cases, 
specific information is verified in cooperation with competent institutions within 
Member States. 
In order to prevent error, the EHIF of Estonia sends its clients a notification via 
postal address when their health insurance has ended in case they have applied for 
the EHIC. They can also request an e-mail notification, when their EHIC has expired. 
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Belgium again reported on the family benefits register, which is a database that 
allows family benefit funds to systematically receive qualified data from authentic 
sources. Through permanent cross-checking of granting data against new qualified 
data, family benefit funds can update their files and make the necessary changes, 
which allows potential social security fraud to be prevented. In addition, the family 
benefits register automatically rejects any double payments in respect of the same 
child for the same period, which allows potential social security fraud to be prevented.  
Germany stated that in order to prevent fraud and error in the family benefits sector, 
it organised bilateral meetings with the liaison bodies of Austria, Poland, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom; informed all child benefits institutions about the new SED 
forms version 3.2; and organised a meeting with clerks working on cross-border cases 
in order to exchange experiences. 
The Czech Republic stated that they did not discover any case of fraud and/or error 
in the field of family benefits.  
2.1.2.6. Unemployment benefits  
In the field of unemployment benefits, only a couple of Member States (CY, DK, PT) 
reported steps taken to prevent fraud and error.  
Regarding controlling and monitoring actions, Cyprus mentioned that all unemployed 
persons are required to register both with the Public Employment Services and the 
Social Insurance Services in person on average every 6 weeks. However, random 
checks are made whereby the persons are contacted over the phone to go and 
register the same day. If it is discovered that unemployed persons have been abroad 
between registrations (without being eligible or having requested the export of 
unemployment benefits) the benefit is terminated. 
To prevent error, the IEFP (Institute of Employment and Vocational Training) of 
Portugal:  
 performs quality checks, with an annual periodicity, of the registered 
information in the IEFP relating to the unemployed person in another Member 
State (export of unemployment benefits) who are seeking employment in 
Portugal. These quality checks have raised the awareness of IEFP staff and 
improved the quality of registrations.  
 organised trainings of the IEFP staff on European Coordination of Social 
Security Systems, more specifically mobility and unemployment benefits 
(including exporting of unemployment benefits: registrations, information to 
the unemployed, documents and exchange of information between the IEFP 
and the competent institution in the other Member State). The impact 
assessment of these trainings has not yet been carried out, since the training 
took place between September and October 2016. 
 Fraud and Error report 2017 
31 
 
 
Lastly, the Czech Republic stated that no special steps in order to prevent fraud 
and/or error were taken in the field of unemployment.  
 
To prevent fraud, the Danish Parliament (DK) adopted a new Unemployment Benefit 
Reform. The purpose of the unemployment benefit reform is to establish a modern 
unemployment benefit system which enhances both mobility and security of the 
Danish labour market for the benefit of both employees and employers. Furthermore, 
increased digitisation will reduce administrative burden and red tape. The three main 
objectives of the unemployment benefit reform are to increase flexibility in the 
unemployment benefits, to improve security for the individually insured unemployed 
person and to modernise and update the unemployment benefit system so as to 
make it simpler, more transparent and easier to administer.  
The administration of the unemployment benefit system will as far as possible be 
carried out digitally, register-based and automatically. A basis for reporting the 
results of the control efforts is planned to be established. As part of the reform, 
unemployment benefits are no longer calculated and paid out on a weekly basis upon 
hours without work. Instead the benefit is paid out on a monthly basis, and payment 
must be made digitally. This allows for a digitally, register-based and automatic 
control where member information about work hours are compared with real-time 
employer information (in the National Income Registry – eIndkomst). The check will 
be carried out on a monthly basis and any erroneous payment will be corrected the 
following month. Furthermore, the digitalisation allows for developing further control 
and reporting systems. This development will take place during 2017/2018. The first 
phase of the unemployment benefit reform entered into force in January 2017 and 
the second phase in July 2017. 
In order to confirm continuous availability, all jobseekers must register for 
employment every 7 days at the Public Employment Service (PES), record 
information about jobseeking in an electronic solution, and during the time of 
unemployment regularly attend personal interviews at the PES. Insured unemployed 
persons must record information about jobseeking in an electronic solution and during 
the interview account for their jobseeking and other activities to get a job in the 
intermediate period. In 2016 a new digital solution was introduced to ensure 
transparency in jobseeking and increase digital control. The new solution will be rolled 
out during 2017/2018. 
As of 2016 Denmark has also stepped up the control of jobseekers’ availability when 
exporting unemployment benefits within the EU by making use of SED U012 asking 
for mandatory monthly follow-up reports. This is in line with the latest proposal 
concerning Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 to strengthen the control procedure when 
exporting unemployment benefits. 
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2.1.2.7. Closing remarks  
Steps taken to prevent fraud and error Member States  
In general: 
Information dissemination  
AT, BG, CZ, DK, ES, 
FI, LT, NL, PL, UK 
Controlling and monitoring actions AT, FI, IE, IT, NL 
Cooperation and data exchange 
BE, DK, FI, HR, IE, 
LT, LV, NL, PL, RO, 
UK 
Documents and e-forms AT, EE, FI, LT 
Other  IT, NL, UK 
In the area of: 
Applicable legislation:  
Specific information dissemination  CY, HU, PL 
Specific controlling and monitoring actions IT, MT, PL 
Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange CY, RO 
Other  HU 
Old-age and survivor’s benefits:  
Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
AT, CH, CY, CZ, DE, 
DK, HU, IT, LT, NO, 
PL, RO, SK 
Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange AT, CY, IT, PL, PT 
Healthcare and sickness benefits in kind:  
Specific information dissemination CH, DE, ES, LT 
Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
BE, CH, DE, EE, HU, 
MT, NL, PL, SK 
Specific preventive measures CH, EE, LT 
Social and invalidity benefits HU, IT 
Family benefits BE, CZ, DE, HU, SK 
Unemployment benefits: CY, DK, PT 
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Member States who replied to Q 1.2 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 1.2 
AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HU, IE, 
IS, IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK, UK 
EL, HR, LI, LU 
Member States who replied to Q 1.3 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 1.3 
AT, BE, BG, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HU, IE, IS, 
IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK, UK 
CY, EL, HR, LI, LU 
 
2.2. Steps taken to combat fraud and error and the effect of 
those steps  
Not only did the Member States take various steps towards preventing fraud and error 
(cf. supra), they also took several measures with the aim of combating them. Again, a 
distinction can be made between general steps and specific steps in particular 
branches of social security. A summary table of these general and specific steps can 
be found at the end of this section (p. 50). 
2.2.1. General steps taken to combat fraud and error 
Regarding the general steps taken to combat fraud and error by the Member States, a 
difference can be made between general steps regarding controlling and monitoring 
actions, general steps regarding cooperation and data exchange, general steps 
regarding the recovery of unduly paid benefits and other general steps.  
2.2.1.1. General steps regarding controlling and monitoring actions  
One category of general steps taken to combat fraud and error relates to controlling 
and monitoring actions. With the aim of combating fraud and/or error, Member States 
reported on regular checks and monitoring actions (AT, DK), as well as investigations 
in individual cases (AT, PL, RO). Related to the foregoing, the Central Compensation 
Office (Centrale de Compensation – CdC - CCO) of Switzerland implemented an 
administrative procedure for handling doubtful cases detected by or reported to them. 
Mentioning the reporting of fraud and error towards competent institutions, in 2016, a 
couple of Member States (BG, CH) refined their reporting tools for fraud and error. 
Like previous years, in 2016, Belgium implemented a new strategic and operational 
plan in order to tackle contribution fraud, social security benefit fraud and illegal 
employment. 
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The United Kingdom mentioned that Each UK territory has its own counter-fraud 
organisations or teams that investigate fraud and error in healthcare. Their role is to 
prevent, deter and detect any potential fraudulent activity by overseas visitors. The 
main counter-fraud bodies are the NHS Protect in England; the Criminal Intelligence 
Unit in Gibraltar; the Counter Fraud Services in Scotland; the Local Counter Fraud 
Specialists in Wales; and the Counter Fraud and Probity Services team in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
As regards the fight against social dumping, the objective set by the Belgian 
government was to put an end to fraudulent postings. Data mining and data matching 
techniques (especially in Limosa but also in other databases) where therefore stepped 
up. This involved making a selection on the basis of a risk assessment with scenarios 
developed and tested by multidisciplinary teams. Feedback from these activities was 
managed in a structured manner so that data mining activities could be refined in an 
iterative process.  
Denmark reported on two specific steps taken in 2016 to combat fraud and error. 
Firstly, the Data Mining Unit together with the Control Unit in Udbetaling Danmark 
developed a new initiative in relation to housing benefits. Based on the Danish 
National Income Registry the initiative identified beneficiaries having a zero household 
income in a period of at least six months. In some cases, this pattern is due to the 
beneficiary having an unregistered income. In other cases, the reason is that another 
person lives unregistered on the address concerned, thus contributing to the 
household income. Both scenarios can lead to incorrect payments. Well over a 
hundred cases were identified for further examination by the initiative, resulting in 
end of payment and claim of recovery in 1 out of 5 cases.  
Secondly, the Data Mining Unit focused on setting up an environment enabling the 
application of Machine Learning and Predictive Analysis in the effort against social 
fraud. Five Data Scientists are now employed in the Data Mining Unit, several new 
data sources are underway and the IT infrastructure is being upgraded to support 
Machine Learning tools (Python and R programming languages). Based on this effort, 
the Data Mining Unit aims to improve precision (less False Positives) when identifying 
potentially fraudulent cases and be able to find fraud cases that would otherwise not 
have been found (new True Positives). The Unit has put together a 2017 roadmap for 
Machine Learning initiatives and expects to be able to assess the effect of these 
initiatives in 2018. 
As mentioned above, in accordance with Article 2 of the Belgian Social Criminal Code, 
Belgium draws up a strategic plan each year and sends this to the Council of 
Ministers before 30 April. The plan relates mainly to the approach used to tackle 
contribution fraud, social security benefit fraud and illegal employment. Following the 
approval of the Council of Ministers, an operational plan is drawn up by 15 
September. This plan comprises two sections: one on the evasion of social security 
contributions and one on social security benefit fraud.  Both sections establish the 
actions to be taken, IT projects to be developed, resources to be implemented, 
objectives to be reached according to measurable indicators and budgetary income to 
be generated by missions of the Bureau fédéral d'orientation (Federal Orientation 
Office). The action plan for the reference year 2016 did not attempt to monitor all 
sectors but rather aimed to combat social security fraud using a targeted approach. 
The strategic plan, therefore, included a schedule of risk-based checks. To this end, 
specialised services were called upon. Social dumping and cross-border social security 
fraud are the biggest challenges faced by social security inspectorates.  
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The Action Plan included the following actions: 
 optimising the use of databases and extending existing databases (extension of 
the Limosa9 register (work permits); increased cross-checking in certain 
sectors (fiscal and social); record of presence on building sites; increased 
cooperation between inspection bodies and fiscal services); 
 defining targets using data mining and feedback of results; 
 strengthening front-office and back-office checks; 
 developing a mix of strategies to target dumping via the Committee on 
combating social dumping;  
Checks have prioritised the following types of fraud: 
 false status declarations (where posted workers are posted under a self-
employed status, whereas in reality they work for an employer; this is a very 
frequent practice in the construction, food and IT industries);  
 the posting of workers holding A1 forms where not even a single posting 
condition is fulfilled;  
 posting ‘arrangements’ where the fraudulent posting is carried out through 
undertakings and subsidiaries of undertakings established in different European 
countries;  
 firms that ‘specialise’ in posting workers (e.g. a temporary employment agency 
located in Country 1 which hires workers from Country 2 and immediately 
posts them to Belgium; temporary employment agencies established in 
Country X which hire pilots who provide their services in other Member States); 
full priority is given to the provision of staff via unauthorised temporary 
employment agencies (at dumping rates);  
 workers who are constantly posted via undertakings (umbrella undertakings 
that temporarily hire self-employed workers for the duration of a specific 
mission for a third party) which act as intermediaries between the user 
undertaking in the host country and the ‘posting’ undertaking (the undertaking 
that posted the worker);  
 posted workers in Belgium where working conditions are not respected in terms 
of minimum wage, working hours and rest periods;  
                                                 
9 Limosa is the Belgian etool implemented for the declaration of cross-border activities in Belgium (please 
visit https://www.international.socialsecurity.be/working_in_belgium/en/home.html for more information). 
The Limosa declaration for cross-border services provided by foreign self-employed service providers in 
Belgium was the subject of a case before the Court of Justice (Judgment of 19 December 2012, European 
Commission v Kingdom of Belgium, C-577/10, EU:C:2012:814) after which the system was revised. 
Subsequently, the Limosa system for posted workers was also brought before the Court of Justice, which 
ruled the system to be in accordance to the Acquis Communautaire since such a system "is capable of being 
justified as safeguarding an overriding ground of public interest, such as the protection of workers or the 
combating of social security fraud" (Judgement of 3 December 2014, De Clercq and Others, C-315/13, 
EU:C:2014:2408). Since 2014, notification systems such as Limosa are mentioned in Article 1, a) of the 
Enforcement Directive (Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through 
the Internal Market Information System ( ‘the IMI Regulation’ ), OJ L 159, 28.5.2014). In the meantime, 
the vast majority of Member States have some sort of notification system in place.  
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 carousel posting arrangements set up by foreign undertakings.  
In addition, checks were stepped up in certain sectors: 
 continuation of checks in the meat, international transport and construction 
sectors; 
 checks in new sectors such as the steel construction, industrial maintenance 
and industrial cleaning; 
 construction sector; 
 umbrella companies. 
In the area of social security benefits, the government planned various measures for 
2016: 
 In the area of healthcare, it has decided to focus on:  
o fraud concerning disability allowance and allowance for hospitalisation 
abroad; 
o the fight against bogus services; 
o implementation of the Anti-Fraud Commission’s action plan; 
o identity fraud committed by patients. 
 
 In the area of unemployment: it has prioritised domicile fraud (lying about your 
registered address to obtain higher benefits) committed by beneficiaries of 
unemployment benefits. 
 In the area of applicable legislation: concerning the scheme applicable to self-
employed workers, the government has prioritised the fight against fictitious 
self-employed workers. 
Lastly, Belgium mentioned the social security inspectorates reform, adopted by the 
government on 10 November 2016, but only operational as of 2017. 
2.2.1.2. General steps regarding cooperation and data exchange 
The improvement of cooperation and data exchange regarding cases of fraud and 
error can also be seen as a general step taken to combat fraud and error. 
On the international level, Member States reported on contacts with foreign liaison 
bodies or the National Contact Point (NCP) of another Member State with the aim of 
detecting cases of fraud or finding solutions in the case of errors (AT, BG, ES, FI, IE, 
LV). Some of these contacts took place in implementation of (bilateral cooperation) 
agreements, others were not regulated by an agreement. Ireland's NCP mentioned 
that during 2016 the European Platform to combat cross-border social security fraud 
and error proved to be an extremely useful tool for sharing information on practices, 
procedures and experiences of Member States in the area of fraud and error. Not only 
did the Platform assist in acting as the point of entry for incoming enquiries from other 
NCPs concerning fraud and error, it also enabled countries to report systematic 
difficulties that are causing delays and errors. 
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In the context of finding solutions, Austria reported that it conducted dialogue 
procedures in 2016. Finland stated that numerous cases were solved by negotiating 
with the other Member States’ institutions and the cases were closed with an Article 
16 agreement. This has secured the social security for the persons concerned for the 
retroactive periods.  
 
Malta was the only Member State reporting on general intra-national cooperation and 
data exchange with the aim of combating fraud and error. Its IT infrastructure in the 
social security field is interconnected with that of other entities, such as the Public 
Employment Service and the Inland Revenue Department. This feature enables the 
verification of the actual registration of the employment activity as well as the 
payment of the relative contributions.  
2.2.1.3. General steps regarding the recovery of unduly paid benefits and 
other sanctions 
A filling part of the reported general steps taken to combat fraud and error concerns 
the recovery of unduly paid benefits and/or other sanctions taken in cases of fraud 
and/or error. 
To remove negative consequences of cases of fraud or error, in addition to the 
recovery of unduly paid benefits (ES, LV, NL, PL, RO) and/or the application of fines 
or correction or withdrawal of the benefit (NL), prosecution authorities are notified 
about the possibility of the commitment of a crime in which cases persons concerned 
can be subject to criminal prosecution (CH, FI, NL, PL, RO). In supervising the 
earnings-related pension insurance in Finland many cases have been taken to the 
appeal courts in order to have precedents. Many of these cases concern A1 
certificates. The Central Compensation Office (Centrale de Compensation - CdC - CCO) 
of Switzerland reported that in 2016 the procedures used to follow up criminal cases 
were optimised.  
2.2.1.4. Other general steps taken to combat fraud and error 
The United Kingdom reported that they continuously perform a review of practices, 
monitoring and evaluate outcomes to enhance and develop pre-emptive and re-active 
processes. In this regard, also Poland mentioned that in 2016 their Social Insurance 
Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Departament Rent Zagranicznych – ZUS 
Belgium reported that with a view to a better use of the existing European 
conciliation procedure concerning disputes about PDs A1, the Social Security Federal 
Public Service has developed Osiris, a monitoring and reporting application used to 
monitor all files processed by inspection bodies/institutions and to report to the Social 
Research and Information Service (Service d'Information et de Recherche Sociale — 
SIRS: a special service reporting directly to the Ministers of Work, Social Affairs and 
Justice, the Minister competent for self-employed workers and the Secretary of State 
responsible for coordinating the fight against fraud), in the form of an electronic 
platform, and to political bodies. Using the data provided by this platform, the 
government can discuss specific cases and difficulties (cooperation etc) at both 
bilateral and European level. The Belgian government promoted the conclusion of 
bilateral cooperation agreements with new Member States in 2016 (Romania, Bulgaria 
and Portugal). Belgium also reported to be an active member of the Benelux 
organisation, working to ensure that the Benelux recommendation of 23 September 
2015 on the fight against social dumping is implemented. Furthermore, in an effort to 
combat cross-border social dumping, the government is planning to carry out joint 
checks and improve structural cooperation between the inspectorates of certain 
countries in order to step up the fight against cross-border social security fraud 
(following the success of a pilot project). 
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DRZ) monitored the effectiveness of the steps taken on a regular basis, that reports 
were generated monthly or quarterly with regard to different areas (e.g. 
overpayments), that the compilation of these data, as well as the results of the 
inspections carried out both by the supervising department or an external body were 
used to evaluate the work of the territorial offices, to solve problems and to create 
strategies to avoid them and that analyses of potential risks were drafted in order to 
combat fraud and error.  
2.2.2. Specific steps taken to combat fraud and error 
In addition to the foregoing general steps, specific measures were also taken in 
particular branches of social security. 
2.2.2.1. Old-age and survivor’s benefits 
(a) Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
In the field of old-age and survivor’s benefits, the request to submit life certificates 
towards beneficiaries was noted by some Member States as a specific controlling 
measure in order to combat fraud and error. Since the majority of the Member States 
reported this step under the category of steps taken to prevent fraud and error, the 
use of life certificates was already discussed in the old-age and survivor’s benefits 
section of the heading of specific steps taken to prevent fraud and error.  
Only Austria and the Netherlands explicitly reported on specific controlling and 
monitoring actions in the field of old-age and survivor’s benefits, by mentioning that 
suspected cases of fraud regarding old-age and survivor’s benefits are examined. For 
this purpose, the Social Insurance Bank (Socialeverzekeringsbank – SVB) of the 
Netherlands has an Enforcement Department with about 100 fraud investigation 
officers who visit clients at their home.  
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(b) Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange 
Some Member States (DK, ES, NL, PL, SK) reported on specific forms of cooperation 
and concrete data exchange in the area of old-age and survivor’s benefits.  
Udbetaling Danmark (DK) for example exchanges data on deaths of pensioners living 
abroad with specific EU Member States on a regular basis in order to combat fraud and 
error. Udbetaling Danmark makes ongoing efforts to expand the number of countries 
with whom data on deceased are exchanged. Spain also reported on bilateral data 
sharing agreements with other Member States to detect cases of fraud involving 
pensions. The Netherlands mentioned that the Social Insurance Bank 
(Socialeverzekeringsbank – SVB) performs intra-national data exchanges with the 
Municipal Population Registration and the Tax Department. The Pension Insurance 
Section of Social Insurance Agency (SIA) (SK) also in 2016 cooperated with social 
insurance institutions of other (EEA) Member States and the Swiss Confederation, 
most intensively with the social insurance institutions of Austria and the Czech 
Republic. This cooperation concerns notifications of pension amounts, deaths of 
beneficiaries or changes of residence. 
The SVB also has an International Verification Unit (IVU). In 2016 the IVU visited 882 
old-age pension and survivor’s benefit clients in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Greece, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Irregularities with 
regard to the amount paid were found in 210 cases.  
 
The SVB prepared in 2016 an intensification of its efforts to combat fraud with regard 
to applicable legislation. The 5 new special fraud officers started their activities in April 
2017.  
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To combat error in cases determined under the Regulations, also in the year 2016 the 
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS) of Poland used the European Online 
Information System of German Old-Age and Disability Insurance (EOA, launched in 
2014) which makes it possible to verify the correctness of the payment of allowances 
due based on Article 58 of Regulation (EU) No 883/2004. Moreover, it is also applied 
to conduct audits in order to check the correctness of granting the already paid old-
age and disability benefits, verify beneficiaries’ address details, check the life and 
residence of beneficiaries residing in Germany and obtain information on persons 
registered in the German system who are at the same time subject to the farmers’ 
social insurance. Thus, it is possible to avoid overpayment of farmers’ old-age and 
disability benefits. 
(c) Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other sanctions 
A third category of reported steps taken to combat fraud and error in the field of old-
age and survivor’s benefits is the recovery of unduly paid benefits and other sanctions. 
Firstly, several Member States (AT, CZ, ES, IT, PL) mentioned the recovery of unduly 
paid benefits as a specific step to combat fraud and error.  
Italy stated that the availability of more channels for gathering information and the 
systematic checks to establish whether a person is alive have considerably reduced 
the cases of missing confirmation and, therefore, the number of recovery requests, 
the number of instalments required for each position and the amounts involved. For 
the year 2016, there were 18,186 re-credit requests addressed to the paying agencies 
in all countries for a total amount of € 6,008,256, of which, to date, 6,354 cases, for 
an amount of € 2,182,645.81, have not been executed:  
       
In all these cases, the local bodies of the Institute launched the procedures for the 
recovery of any undue amounts and, if appropriate, passed the matter on to the 
judicial authorities.  
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For payments abroad, limiting the investigation to instalments not yet recovered, in 
2016 a total of 2,904 instalments were paid in Member States of the EU, the EEA or 
Switzerland even after the beneficiaries had already died, for a total amount of € 
1,045,542.52: 
 
In particular 2,133 instalments were collected post mortem belonging to the group of 
cases of recovery of one or two instalments (classified as errors), amounting to € 
772,059.42. The number of instalments where three or more instalments were 
collected post mortem (cases classified as fraud) was 771 amounting to € 273.483.10: 
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Secondly, the suspension of payments of unjustly paid benefits and/or the withdrawal 
of benefits are mentioned (CZ). 
Lastly, criminal charges are noted as a possible consequence in circumstances where  
old-age and survivor’s benefits were unduly received (AT, CZ). In this regard, the LOB 
Guarantee Fund of Switzerland stated that to combat fraud there were 173 cases in 
2016 in which the LOB Guarantee Fund, pursuant to Article 56(5) LOB, refused to pay 
benefits worth CHF 1.9 million on grounds of abuse (the CEO is insured under the 
occupational pension scheme and does not pay the contributions due to the pension 
fund which produces the effect that the CEO is not paid any benefits). Charges were 
filed against three employers because they deducted the contributions for the 
occupational pension scheme from the salaries of their employees but failed to pass 
them on to the pension fund (Article 76 LOB). 
2.2.2.2. Applicable legislation 
(a) Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
A frequent occurring type of control relating to applicable legislation is the initiating of 
regular checks of PDs A1, whereby the authenticity of the presented document is 
verified and posting conditions are being double-checked (BE, BG, CZ, HU, PT, RO). 
Sometimes these checks are performed at the express request of competent 
institutions of other Member States.  
Poland mentioned that the main step taken in the year 2016 by their Social 
Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Departament Rent 
Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) in order to combat both fraud and error in cases 
determined under the Regulations was launch of a central register of issued PDs A1. 
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The National Revenue Agency (NRA) of Bulgaria reported that the most common 
types of error, inconsistencies or fraud found during the checks conducted by NRA 
TD/office for the period 01.01.2016 – 31.12.2016 included:  
 filing a request for a certificate without existing grounds for the issuing thereof;  
 persons not declaring a change in the circumstances which would give grounds 
for cancellation or termination of the validity of an issued certificate – 
particularly with regard to work in two countries where the persons do not want 
the current determination of the applicable legislation but later, after the expiry 
of the period;  
 the submission of A1 certificates not issued by NRA via the General Labour 
Inspectorate Executive Agency and the competent institutions of other Member 
States; 
 submitting insurance data about persons for whom an A1 certificate is 
requested, after a certificate has been issued under the applicable law, being 
corrected or deregistered by the employer;   
 unjustified return of issued A1 certificates due to the fact that the employer has 
not observed the provision of Article 6а of the Social Insurance Code; 
 submitting copies of requests filed to NRA for the issue of an A1 certificate with 
the number and date to institutions from other Member States to prove 
particular applicable law for which refusals were issued subsequently.  
 
On 25.01.2016 a campaign was launched in Bulgaria for checking the compliance of 
taxable persons with the applicable legislation in accordance with the rules on the 
coordination of social security systems of Member States. For a period of six months, 
226 taxable persons with a high risk of committing violations of the social insurance 
legislation were checked, and 25 of the checks were conducted jointly with controlling 
bodies of the General Labour Inspectorate Executive Agency. Types of committed 
errors identified in 2016:  
 Non-fulfilment of the obligation to notify NRA upon a change of the 
circumstances in the case of an issued A1 certificate – these are identified 
cases of errors in which the A1 certificate has been issued but the revenue 
administration found that the respective employee was not effectively 
seconded to another Member State or upon return of the seconded person to 
Bulgaria prior to expiry of the secondment term to another Member State the 
A1 certificate was not returned within the legally prescribed time limit. In 
2016, in 12 cases were such errors found.   
 Non-compliance with the obligation for filing the A1 certificate where this is 
required, i.e. identified cases of error where the administration found that 
employees were seconded to another Member State for which the employer 
did not submit a request for an A1 certificate. This type of error was found 
most commonly when conducting inspections and audits, and in the course of 
the proceedings the persons took action to submit requests for A1 certificates. 
In 2016, 1,150 cases of this type of error were found. 
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As mentioned before, concerning the scheme applicable to self-employed workers, the 
Belgian government has prioritised the fight against fictitious self-employed workers. 
In 2016, the competent institute (INASTI — National Institute of Social Insurance for 
Self-employed Persons) continued to combat suspect affiliations carried out with the 
clear intention of obtaining the right to permanent residence in Belgium. Fictitious 
affiliations may also result in affiliation with the self-employment scheme, without any 
real professional activity being practised, with the sole aim of obtaining benefits, 
especially as regards social assistance and healthcare. The appropriate checks are 
carried out by the Inspection and Obligations Services. Affiliations for which either the 
social insurance fund or the national institute find that the professional activity 
mentioned clearly does not fall under the social security status of self-employed 
workers were sent for inspection to the competent inspectorates. 
Action 32 of the Belgian government's action plan of 12 April 2016 provided for 200 
anti-dumping front-office checks in 2016 (for all social security and employment 
inspectorates: the National Security Office (NSSO – ONSS), the Social Legislation 
Inspectorate (SLI – CLS) and the Social Inspection of the FPS Social Security (SI -
IS)). This translated into one check per month coordinated by the three inspectorates 
on sites selected using a data-mining system that calculates the risk of fraud. 
The volume of anti-dumping investigations in 2016 concerning only the ‘determination 
of applicable legislation’ aspect carried out by the social security inspectorate (of the 
Social Security Federal Public Service): 
Name of institution type 
Number of 
investigations 
Number of persons 
checked 
Open investigations 380 1,528 
Closed investigations 322 2,338 
 
The number of workers checked as part of closed investigations is higher than that in 
open investigations as the data is systematically shown in the first case and often 
missing in the latter. 
Rectifications resulting from anti-dumping investigations from 1 January to 31 
December 2016: 
Irregularities Number of 
cases 
rectified 
Total amount 
of 
rectification 
Number of 
workers 
rectified 
Foreign MS requested to withdraw 
E101-E102-A1 
17 4,004,321.89 257 
LACK of E101-E102-A1 — Belgian SS 
rectified 
9 1,496,255.36 67 
Total — request for application of 
Belgian social security legislation 
26 5,500,577.25 324 
Salaries labourers - Declaration 2 33,699.58 7 
 
Comments made by Belgium to the foregoing table: 
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26 investigations resulted in findings which showed that the social security legislation 
of a State other than Belgium was unduly applied. In 17 cases, the social security 
inspectorate requested the competent institution of the other EU Member State 
applying its legislation to withdraw the A1 certificate. Such requests concerned an 
estimated € 4,004,321.89 of remuneration and 257 workers. In nine cases, the 
employer carried out the necessary formalities in order to have the workers covered 
under Belgian social security (for an amount of € 1,496,255.36 and 67 workers). 
After being notified by the competent institution of the decision to withdraw the A1 
certificate, the social security inspectorate declared two employers who employed 
seven workers, with total remuneration amounting to € 33,699.58, under the Belgian 
social security system. 
To correctly assess these results, one must consider the length of time between 
sending the request for withdrawal of the A1 certificate to the competent institution 
and obtaining the response, and then the time required to gather the data necessary 
to prepare the social security declaration in order to determine the social security 
contributions payable.  
In almost all cases, the whole process takes well over one year. This means that, for a 
given year, the investigations which resulted in a request for withdrawal and those 
which effectively resulted in declarations to the ONSS are not the same. There is 
easily one year between the two. In short, the requests for an A1 withdrawal relate to 
checks carried out in 2015 and 2016, whilst the ONSS rectifications relate to checks 
carried out in 2014 and 2015. 
These comments also apply to the results of all checks concerning the ‘determination 
of applicable legislation’ carried out by the Social Security Inspectorate, which is the 
only service to have recorded findings on this specific matter in 2016. These results 
are presented in the following two tables. 
The volume of overall investigations in 2016 concerning only the ‘determination of 
applicable legislation’ aspect carried out by the ‘cross-border’ units of the social 
security inspectorate (of the Social Security Federal Public Service): 
Name of institution type 
Number of 
investigations 
Number of persons 
checked 
Open investigations 2 496 12,073 
Closed investigations 2 387 22,838 
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Rectifications resulting from investigations carried out by the ‘cross-border’ units from 
1 January to 31 December 2016: 
Irregularities 
Number of 
rectifications 
Total amount 
of rectification 
(in €) 
Number 
of 
workers 
rectified 
Foreign MS requested to withdraw E101-E102-A1 131 38,722,164.87 1 588 
LACK of E101-E102-A1 — Belgian SS rectified 106 17,734,324.45 1 272 
Total — request for application of Belgian 
social security legislation 
237 56,456,489.32 2 860 
Salaries employees-Declaration 12 2,563,012.03 56 
Salaries labourers-Declaration 146 44,853,109.20 2 513 
Total — rectified declarations sent to the 
ONSS 
158 47,416,121.23 2 569 
 
(b) Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange 
Cyprus reported a close collaboration with competent institutions of other Member 
States in order to combat fraud and error relating to applicable legislation.  
Belgium mentioned that as regards the specific fraud relating to fictitious residence, 
cooperation and the exchange of private data were planned between various public 
institutions and prosecutor’s offices at the labour courts. This cooperation is being set 
up either directly by the prosecution departments or via the municipalities and the 
competent police districts.   
(c) Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other sanctions 
The last type of steps taken to combat fraud and error in the area of applicable 
legislation are the recovery of unduly paid benefits and other sanctions. 
Cyprus reported that in a general effort to combat undeclared work, an amendment 
to the social insurance legislation was adopted which introduced administrative 
penalties in relation to undeclared work and/or undeclared insurable earnings. These 
penalties can be in the form of high administrative fines or even temporary suspension 
of the business operations. Furthermore, the law stipulates that employers/self-
employed persons who fail to pay the contributions or comply with other provisions of 
the law are subject to legal proceedings. 
2.2.2.3. Unemployment benefits 
No special innovative steps to combat fraud and error in the area of unemployment 
benefits were reported by the Member States concerning the reference year 2016.  
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Hungary reported that in order to enhance the effectiveness of combating potential 
errors in case of unemployment benefits, according to the information provided by the 
MNE, the Hungarian Employment Authority recovers/reclaims the unduly paid benefit 
from the person when the latter did not fulfil his or her reporting obligation necessary 
when starting to work abroad during the period of the unemployment benefit being 
provided under Hungarian legislation. In cases where EU forms (e.g. PD U1) were 
filled in with some misspellings by other Member States’ competent institutions, the 
Hungarian Employment Authority requested a reviewed/modified certificate from the 
foreign authorities concerned. The MNE reported that the Hungarian Employment 
Authority reclaimed unduly paid unemployment benefits in approximately 50 cases, 
amounting up to approximately € 6,000. The Hungarian Employment Authority 
received reviewed/modified certificates (PDs U1) from Member States’ authorities in 
nearly 40 cases, in case of mistakes related to the inappropriate filling out of the 
forms concerned. 
The National Agency for Employment (ANOFM) of Romania mentioned that in the 
field of unemployment benefits, 1 single case of fraud was handled during 2016. 
Pursuant to the request of a competent Austrian institution, the Romanian National 
Agency for Employment, which is the liaison body for unemployment benefits, took the 
necessary steps to check if a Romanian national receiving Austrian unemployment 
benefits was entitled to receive other benefits in Romania. As a result, while benefiting 
from Romanian indemnity for child-raising, the person concerned was employed and 
later on entitled and receiving unemployment benefits in Austria. The case was settled 
with the person paying back the undue amount of the Romanian child-raising 
indemnity, thus retaining his entitlement to Austrian unemployment benefits. It should 
be noted that, under the Romanian national provisions in force, a person who receives 
child-raising indemnity is not entitled to any other income or benefits. 
2.2.2.4. Family benefits   
(a) Specific controlling and monitoring actions 
Belgium reported that domicile checks of insured persons are still used to combat 
family benefit fraud and errors. These checks are arranged by the family benefit funds 
that pay family benefits and are carried out by the FAMIFED inspection service. 
Domicile checks, which specifically target situations where there is a high risk that 
family benefits have been unduly paid, are carried out at the case handler's request in 
the event of doubt regarding the accuracy of the declarations made by the insured 
person or where the real household situation does not seem to correspond to official 
data from an authentic source. Where controllers carry out checks in response to risk 
factors, they perform the check that is necessary in order to clarify the situation. For 
example, they check whether the persons in question really live at the official address 
by checking utility bills, lease agreements, passports and other relevant documents. If 
this is not enough, cooperation with the local police, approved by the prosecutor’s 
offices at the labour courts, may be necessary to enable controllers to reach a 
conclusion. The national register can also be adapted as a result of this cooperation. In 
addition, social security controllers regularly work with other inspectorates, at both 
federal and EU level, so that the results of checks can be used not only in relation to 
family benefits but also by ONEM (National Employment Office), INAMI (National 
Institute for Health and Disability Insurance), social housing corporations etc. 
(b) Specific cooperation and concrete data exchange 
In the field of family benefits, Belgium, Denmark and Hungary undertook some 
steps in order to combat fraud and error in the reference year 2016 related to 
cooperation and data exchange.  
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Hungary on the other hand reported that the CANPI – concerning family benefits – 
automatically verifies with the competent institutions of the other Member State 
concerned any relevant information about benefits being provided to the persons 
concerned before beginning to pay family benefits under Hungarian legislation. Lastly, 
Belgium reported on the creation of Famicontrol, a structured database for 
controllers. 
(c) Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other sanctions 
A few Member States (BG, HU, SK) reported the recovery of unduly paid benefits as a 
step taken to combat fraud and error in the area of family benefits in the reference 
year 2016.  
2.2.2.5. Healthcare and sickness benefits in kind  
In the field of healthcare and sickness benefits in kind, Poland mentioned that the 
National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia – NFZ) in 2016 continued its claim 
verification activity in the area of combating fraud and error in cases determined 
under the Regulations, as presented in the 2015 questionnaire. Cooperation and data 
exchange initiatives were pursued (BE, EE, ES, NL), although the Estonian Health 
Insurance Fund noted that they currently have no bilateral agreements with other 
Member States and therefore the majority of the problems are being resolved by e-
mail.  
 
Austria mentioned that the practice of recovery of costs arising from inappropriate 
use of the EHIC is continued.  
To combat fraud, cooperation on information exchange in concrete cases between 
Udbetaling Danmark (DK) and Försäkringskassan (SE) is ongoing and aims to secure 
correct payment of benefits in each of the institutions. Personal information like 
name, address, age, nationality, payments and the right to benefits are exchanged. 
Cooperation between Denmark and Sweden is valuable because of the level of 
mobility between the two countries, affecting the number of application for social 
benefits.  
Belgium mentioned the cooperation of INAMI (National Institute for Health and 
Disability Insurance) within the Benelux project group on social benefit fraud in order 
to detect illicit accumulation of social benefits and revenue from unauthorised work in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg as a step taken to combat fraud and error. 
INAMI has issued new instructions to the Belgian sickness funds to better inform their 
invalidity pensioners when a pro rata invalidity case is investigated on their behalf 
and Belgium is paying advances on the foreign invalidity pension, in order to remind 
them of their obligation to cooperate with the examination of their rights to the 
foreign (pro rata) invalidity pension under the regulation and to prevent potential 
recovery procedures afterwards (combating errors). Besides, INAMI obtained the legal 
authorisation of the Social Security Sectoral Committee to exchange data with the 
Netherlands; the technical development of the exchange between Belgium and the 
Netherlands is pending. 
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2.2.2.6. Closing remarks 
 Steps taken to combat fraud and error Member States  
In general: 
Controlling and monitoring actions AT, BE, BG, CH, DK, PL, RO, UK 
Cooperation and data exchange AT, BE, BG, ES, FI, IE, LV, MT 
Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other 
sanctions 
CH, ES, FI, LV, NL, PL, RO 
Other  PL, UK 
In the area of: 
Old-age and survivor’s benefits:  
Specific controlling and monitoring actions AT, NL 
Specific cooperation and concrete data 
exchange 
DK, ES, NL, PL, SK 
Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other 
sanctions 
AT, CZ, ES, IT, PL 
Applicable legislation:  
Specific controlling and monitoring actions BE, BG, CZ, HU, PT, RO 
Specific cooperation and concrete data 
exchange 
BE, CZ, CY 
Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other 
sanctions 
CY 
Unemployment benefits HU, RO 
Family benefits:  
Specific controlling and monitoring actions BE 
Specific cooperation and concrete data 
exchange 
BE, DK, HU 
Recovery of unduly paid benefits and other 
sanctions 
BG, HU, SK 
Healthcare and sickness benefits in kind AT, BE, EE, ES, NL, PL 
Special non-contributory cash benefits MT 
 
Member States who replied to Q1.1 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 1.1 
AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, 
IE, IS, IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK, UK 
EL, LI, LU 
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2.3. National legislation relevant to preventing and combating 
fraud and error 
The Member States have corrected, updated or completed Annex I of the 2016 report 
on fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination (reference year 2015) 
where necessary. The results can be found in Annex I of this year’s report.  
When observing the corrections, updates and completions, only two significant special 
matters are eye-catching:  
1. the national legislation of Norway especially targeting fraud against the 
National Insurance Scheme, whereby specific definitions of fraud are given 
(with specific criteria) and the fraud itself is qualified as a crime with specific 
sanctions in the Norwegian Penal Code; 
2. Article 21(3) of the Law on State Social Insurance of Latvia, according to 
which the State Social Insurance Agency can transfer a person’s social 
insurance contributions made in another EU Member State to Latvia. 
Amendments entered into force on 25 October 2016; this is the only example 
of national legislation concerning social fraud and error in cross-border cases.  
It is clear that Member States keep introducing new national legislation concerning 
social fraud and error, although rarely targeted specifically at cross-border cases.  
Lastly, it can be observed that still no uniform definition of social security fraud and 
error is available. Just like the European coordination Regulations, the national 
legislations often do not provide any kind of definition, although the recent 
Commission proposal to revise the social security coordination Regulations includes a 
definition of fraud.10 In the cases where a definition is provided in national legislation, 
it often concerns a very broad definition which is not repeated in other legislation.  
Please see Annex I for the detailed country sheets on the existing national legislation 
concerning social fraud and error. 
Member States who replied to Q 1.4 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 1.4 
AT, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, 
LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, SK 
BG, EL, FI, LI, LU, MT, NL, RO, UK 
                                                 
10 The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (COM(2016) 815 final) intends to include a new 
definition of "fraud". Its Article 2.4 states that “In Article 1(2), the following point is inserted after 
paragraph (e): “(ea) ‘fraud’ means any intentional act or omission to act, in order to obtain or receive social 
security benefits or to avoid to pay social security contributions, contrary to the law of a Member State;". It 
should be noted that this definition includes a link with the (different) national legislative frameworks of the 
Member States.   
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3. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE EU 
COORDINATION RULES WHICH MAY LEAD TO (AT LEAST 
RISKS OF) FRAUD AND ERROR  
The Member States have reported various specific problems in implementing the EU 
coordination rules which may lead to fraud and error. The problems are categorised 
and set forth hereinafter. Problems arise concerning the (lack of) exchange of data 
between Member States, cross-border investigation and cooperation in general, the 
determination of the applicable legislation, the recovery of unduly paid benefits and 
the use of the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC). A summary table of these 
specific problems in implementing the EU coordination rules which may lead to fraud 
and error can be found at the end of this section (p. 60). 
3.1. Problems regarding the (lack of) exchange of data between 
Member States 
3.1.1. The lack of/difficult exchange of data or facts that influence 
the entitlement to a benefit 
Various Member States (AT, BE, EE, ES, HR, IE, LT, PL, SK) expressed their 
displeasure regarding (the lack of) exchange of data on deaths or other facts 
influencing the entitlement to a benefit. It was reported that there is rarely a 
formalised, structured exchange of data with other countries, and that ad hoc 
exchanges often come with a (significant) delay or even do not take place at all. 
Belgium mentioned that the average response time is three months, which is very 
long when dealing with a case of fraud. 
Spain stated that in some cases, the significant delay in notifications of a termination 
of entitlement to benefits in kind is due to information coordination problems between 
the national institutions competent for pensions and those competent for sickness 
insurance. However, such anomalies are in their opinion also the result of failure by 
the insured parties themselves to timely provide information about any change in their 
personal and/or family circumstances, such as a change of residence, in accordance 
with Article 76(4) third subparagraph of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. As this 
inappropriate conduct by those concerned has no financial implications for them, they 
have no interest in changing it, even though it has economic repercussions for both 
the competent institutions and the institutions of the place of residence. Hungary 
seconds the foregoing and adds that the risk of fraud and error is even greater in the 
case of family benefits, i.e. in the children allowance granting procedure. Currently, 
data exchange is performed by the submission of hard copies; the stated proceedings 
are therefore unjustifiably long-lasting and result in overlapping of benefits and undue 
payments.  
With regard to the foregoing, Poland reported the impossibility of getting assistance 
from some Member States concerning deaths of beneficiaries due to the lack of access 
to institutions’ registers, which results in a need to continue to send life certificates in 
paper form. Italy on the other hand again noted that the lack of a European-level 
database that registers migration outflows and inflows makes it difficult to monitor the 
permanent, habitual residence of workers and recipients of social welfare and social 
security benefits. 
52 
 
The Belgian National Institute for the Social Security of the Self-employed (NISSE) 
stated to encounter difficulties obtaining information from tax administrations from 
various Member States. Such information is necessary to verify whether or not the 
conditions for the posting of a self-employed person are met (e.g. checking whether 
someone is or has been substantially active in Member State of establishment). 
3.1.2. The lack of / unknown / inconsistent legal bases for the 
international exchange of data 
The Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund (Schweizerische Unfallversicherung – 
Suva) reported that legal provisions that would make an international exchange of 
data possible are non-existent/unknown/inconsistent. In the same regard, Italy 
mentioned that experience suggests that cooperation between institutions is a very 
effective tool for limiting the risk of fraud or error. Unfortunately, the arrangements 
for the exchange of information and the implementation of the related operating 
procedures depend on the willingness of the institutions involved, requiring long 
negotiations between the parties. According to Italy it does not seem possible to 
obtain satisfactory results by means of almost spontaneous initiatives implemented in 
the framework of administrative cooperation provided for under current European 
legislation. Given the interest in the proper payment of benefits, there is a need for 
European rules obliging the social security institutions to forward to institutions from 
other Member States involved, as soon as possible and using IT tools, all information 
on the death of recipients of benefits paid on the basis of the international 
accumulation of contributions.  
3.1.3. Constraints of the national laws on the protection of 
personal data 
Some Member States (AT, BE, CH, IT, PT) reported that the exchange of data is 
sometimes made difficult by national rules on data protection.  
Italy mentioned that in some cases, bilateral agreements regarding data exchange 
are not reached because of concerns resulting from the constraints of the national 
laws on the protection of personal data.  
Austria reported that requests for information are often not complied with as a result 
of data protection rules under existing national legislative provisions. Portugal also 
stated that in the field of accidents at work and occupational diseases (provision of 
benefits in kind), competent institutions sometimes issue or request PDs A1 (former 
E123), omitting or not identifying injuries resulting from an accident at work or 
occupational disease, based on the need to protect personal data. Such practice 
increases the risk of error insofar as it may lead to the provision of undue benefits 
(not in conformity with the type of injury actually involved). Portugal expects that, 
with the implementation of the electronic data exchange and the mandatory fulfilment 
of the field associated with the type of injury, this constraint will be overcome. 
3.1.4. Other specific problems 
Spain reported on one other specific problem. Regarding unemployment benefits, the 
French institutions request numerous documents, including the last four payslips, 
before sending the U1 form. Spain is concerned about the possibility that the French 
institutions may be compiling U1 forms without having access to employment or social 
security information – hence their requests for that amount of information – and they 
might not even be able to verify whether the worker has other periods of employment 
or has received unemployment benefits in France. Yet another example of how a lack 
of information (exchange) hampers or might hamper the correct application of the EU 
legal framework. 
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3.2. Problems regarding cross-border investigation and 
cooperation in general 
3.2.1. The lack of/difficulties regarding cooperation  
Various Member States (AT, CH, CZ, DK, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, RO) reported 
difficulties regarding cooperation between the Member States. Austria reported that 
there often is a lack of cross-border cooperation with consequently a lack of 
information, evidence and action. If there is any cooperation at all, requests for 
information are frequently not fulfilled or fulfilled with a delay, resulting in lengthy 
processing times and in some circumstances making the implementation of potential 
penalties difficult or impossible, owing to a lack of information. Language barriers also 
add to lengthy processing times. The legal department of the Federal Social Insurance 
Office of Switzerland, too, encounters difficulties in obtaining the responses 
necessary for dealing with cases that fall within the scope of Title IV of Regulation 
(EC) No 987/2009. Relations with Portugal are particularly affected despite the 
creation of a dedicated contact point in November 2014 with the Benefits and 
Contributions Department (DPC) of the Portuguese Social Security Institute and with 
the Social Security Financial Management Institute (IGFSS).   
The Hungarian Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (CANPI) (family 
benefit sector) on the other hand indicated that Member States’ authorities also 
contribute to certain elements of malfunctioning of the implementation of the 
Regulations, since they often experience that Member States fail to request all 
necessary information from the competent institutions of another Member State 
before providing family benefits. Lithuania even reported that in the field of family 
benefits there were cases where competent institutions of other Member States did 
not send SEDs but asked the person concerned to apply for the relevant SED or E-
form personally. Moreover, in one case the E-form was filled in by the employer. 
A few Member States (LT, NL, PL, RO) reported that the lack of updated contact 
information of Member States’ social insurance institutions makes cross-border 
cooperation difficult. In certain cases SEDs sent by post were returned as the address 
of the receiving institution was changed. Also the Netherlands mentioned that part 
of the exchange issue seems to be that it is unclear where to address specific 
questions. This causes delay in investigations and therefore the effect of efforts to 
reduce the violation of rules. 
3.2.2. The lack of procedures for the investigation of suspected 
cases of fraud and error across borders under the 
coordination rules 
Udbetaling Danmark (DK) finds it problematic that the implementation of the 
coordination rules does not include procedures for investigating cases of suspected 
fraud and error across borders. Udbetaling Danmark particularly observes that none of 
the SEDs seem appropriate for this task and some of the competent institutions in the 
Member State do not seem to be familiar with cooperating across borders on fraud 
and error. When Udbetaling Danmark investigates a concrete fraud and error case, 
information on where the person is living in one country or the other is crucial. In this 
regard there may be a need for information indicating whether a person is residing in 
one country or the other (such as address or information on economic activity). Such 
information is not necessarily needed during the application process and for this 
reason the competent institution may stand with uncomprehending eyes towards the 
request and does not provide the requested information.  
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In order to solve the foregoing problem, national Single Points of Contact (SPOCs) 
would be highly relevant, as a SPOC function should be able to facilitate requests to 
the correct recipients. In this regard, the NCP group could be a starting point.  
 
3.2.3. Constraints on national laws 
The Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund (Schweizerische Unfallversicherung – 
Suva) reported the differences between legal systems (e.g. as regards occupational 
and non-occupational accidents, duration of the provision of benefits) as pressure 
points regarding cross-border investigation and cooperation.  
Romania mentioned a lack of uniformity when applying the provisions of the 
European Regulations. 
3.3. Problems regarding the applicable legislation 
3.3.1. The determination of the applicable legislation itself  
Various Member States (AT, FI, HU, MT, LV) reported that errors often arise from 
unfamiliarity with the coordination rules in the case of persons working in several 
Member States. 
According to Finland, Hungary and Malta, the rules on activity in more than one 
Member State (Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, Article 16 of Regulation 
(EC) No 987/2009) are hard to understand and difficult to apply. This enables misuse 
of these rules by some of the employers and the rise of the probability of erroneous 
decisions by the clerks. Finland mentioned that the lack of clear rules also means that 
workers moving around Europe are not aware of their rights and cannot easily predict 
how their social security will be arranged. Article 65(2) of Regulation 883/2004 states: 
”A wholly unemployed person who, during his last activity as an employed or self-
employed person, resided in a Member State other than the competent Member State 
and who continues to reside in that Member State or returns to that Member State 
shall make himself available to the employment services in the Member State of 
residence.” As there are differences between the Member States in the levels of 
unemployment benefits, there is some tendency to give false information about one’s 
state of residence and about possibly returning there. Generally, the question about 
state of residence is quite open to different interpretations and therefore also prone to 
error.  
Hungary adds that many persons pursuing activities in more than one Member State 
are not aware of their notification (reporting) duties and pay social security 
contributions in more than one Member State. Malta stated that the high risk of fraud 
and error in these situations is also related to the fact that the institutions rely mainly 
on the information provided by the applicants (employer and employee) which, in 
some cases, is not easily verifiable. A practical example is the condition of one month 
prior affiliation required in order to apply the posting rule. Sometimes the institution 
has no means of verifying whether the worker was actually physically present in the 
country prior to the commencement of the posting period. Although on paper workers 
are registered as employees of the company, this could also be fictitious in order to 
conform to the posting conditions. 
Austria mentioned the absence of binding effect and consequences of decisions 
taken under the dialogue procedure as a problem. 
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Lastly, Latvia stated that according to amendments to Article 213 of the Law on State 
Social Insurance (entered into force on 25 October, 2016) the State Social Insurance 
Agency of Latvia can transfer person’s social insurance contributions made in another 
Member State to Latvia or vice versa if a person has paid social contributions in two or 
more Member States at the same time. Therefore, some problems arise which can 
lead to error in cases determined under the Regulations. First of all, not every EU 
Member State has legislation which allows transfer of social insurance contributions. 
Secondly, there are practical problems with defining the applicable legislation (in other 
words, which Member State will transfer the social insurance contributions and for 
which insurance periods).  
3.3.2. The determination of the place of residence / whether an 
undertaking is carrying out a significant part of its activity in 
the sending or posting State / of marginal work 
Various Member States reported difficulties concerning the determination of the place 
of residence (AT, BG, CZ, DK, ES, HU, LT), the determination if an undertaking is 
carrying out a significant part of its activity in the sending or posting State (CZ, DK, 
LT, PL) and the determination of marginal work (CZ, DK, LT, PL). 
Regarding the determination of the place of residence, Member States find the criteria 
ambiguous. Usually the competent institution has to rely only on the information 
provided by the applicant, which often leads to error and/or fraud. Austria stated that 
the determination is difficult since there is no central registration system in some 
Member States regarding health insurance and residence. The Czech Republic 
mentioned that although there is Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, Decision 
U2 and judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) there are no 
specific criteria to assess residence, which gives rise to one of the biggest problems in 
the field of coordination, not just for clients for whom it is difficult to understand it, 
but also for officers for whom it is difficult to explain it to clients and deal with the 
consideration of residence. Moreover, according to the Czech Republic it seems that 
there is no united approach towards this matter across the Member States. 
For what concerns the determination whether the undertaking carries out a significant 
part of its activity in the sending or posting State, it is found that ambiguous criteria 
lay the foundation for error and fraud. Poland particularly mentioned the criteria of 
the number of staff in the posting State and the criterion “about 25%” of the turnover 
achieved by the undertaking in the country where it is situated. 
Difficulties in the determination of marginal work occur especially when applying 
Article 13(3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, i.e. carrying out a self-employment 
activity in one Member State and being an employee in another. The explanation of 
what marginal activity is, can be found in the Practical Guide. According to Poland 
these explanations are, however, not relevant to situations covered by the above 
Article. 
3.3.3. Problems arising from the use of PDs and SEDs 
Austria and Greece reported that PD A1 is inadequately protected against forgery. As 
a counter-measure to fraudulent PDs A1 the Greek Public Employment Service 
(Organismou Apascholisis Ergatikou Dynamikou – OAED) proposed a solution which is 
in their view easy to implement and to the point: the PIN (Personal Identification 
Number) of the person concerned must be added on all pages of the PD A1 along with 
the signature and seal of the competent institution on the bottom of all pages and in 
the adjoining points of the pages. 
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In addition, Austria stated that the withdrawal by foreign institutions of incorrectly 
issued PDs A1 is difficult or impossible to enforce. 
3.3.4. Problems arising from ignorance of beneficiaries regarding 
the applicable legislation 
Belgium reported a specific problem in implementing the EU coordination rules in the 
field of invalidity benefits. For persons who were lastly insured in Belgium at the 
moment they became incapacitated for work (which lead to invalidity afterwards), 
Belgium will pay a provisional benefit which must be considered partially as an 
advance on invalidity pensions of other Member States. Once the other Member State 
has taken a decision to grant an invalidity pension as well, Belgium will calculate the 
final amount of the partial Belgian invalidity benefit due under Article 46 of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 and recover the advances via the pension arrears due by the other 
Member State which Belgium always asks to hold in reserve (application of Article 
72(2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009).  
Nevertheless, it is sometimes impossible to calculate the exact amount of advances 
within the two-month timeframe given by Article 72(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009, as a result of which the other institution pays its invalidity pension arrears 
directly to the person concerned. In that case, pensioners are sometimes misinformed 
that because of the expiration of the two-month time delay, Belgium would no longer 
have a claim on the pension arrears. This is not correct, and Belgium will recover 
these amounts directly from the pensioner concerned (see also the case Cabras).11 
Persons receiving (pro rata) invalidity benefits from Belgium and (an)other Member 
State(s) under Article 46 of the Regulation are confronted with different national 
legislations that regulate certain situations differently. This is a source of confusion. As 
such, these persons are not always aware that certain changes in their personal 
situation (e.g. a changed household situation/revenue, starting a salaried or self-
employed activity etc) impact on the amount of the Belgian benefit and should thus be 
reported to or even authorised by the competent Belgian institution, whereas these 
situations do not at all impact on the invalidity benefits received from the other 
Member State concerned. This is most often the case for persons receiving a pro rata 
benefit for short periods of work in Belgium in the past and who are thus not very 
familiar with Belgian legislation (however, they are informed of their obligations under 
Belgian legislation in the decision granting the benefit, but possibly do not always 
understand, due to for example poor knowledge of the language in which the decision 
is drafted).    
Belgian invalidity insurance is a risk-based system, in which the benefit amount is not 
calculated on the basis of the total amount of the insurance period completed in 
Belgium (thus not an invalidity ‘pension’). This implies that the right to invalidity 
benefits is made dependent on the obligation of the beneficiary to claim potential 
invalidity pension rights that may exist under other foreign legislations. However, 
when on behalf of these persons a pro rata case file is investigated under Article 47 of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, it can be found that persons mistakenly take the 
Belgian invalidity benefit for granted, and do not cooperate with the foreign institution 
examining the pro rata claim or renounce the claim (e.g. when asked to send 
elements of proof of their insurance career when no databases are available, or when 
the person concerned is asked to move to the State concerned for an additional 
medical exam). This is often the case when the amount of the foreign pension is only 
minimal (short career). 
                                                 
11 Judgment of 21 March 1990, Cabras, C-199/88, EU:C:1990:127. 
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3.4. Problems regarding the recovery of unduly paid benefits 
The LOB Guarantee Fund of Switzerland reported a problem that arises in 
occupational pension schemes when employers who have their head office in a 
Member State, employ people in Switzerland and are obliged to insure them under an 
occupational pension scheme (in Switzerland). If these employers fail to pay the 
contributions that are due, it is very difficult to recover the contributions abroad 
(particularly because pension funds are not able to issue any injunction to levy the 
contributions). 
Poland seconds Switzerland regarding the foregoing. It considers it a problem that 
national regulations or practice prevent the return of benefits transferred to the bank 
account of people entitled to benefits after their death.  
3.5. Problems regarding the EHIC 
Various Member States (AT, DE, EE, IE, NL, PL) reported on risks of fraud and error 
related to the use of the EHIC.  
First of all, the fact that EHICs are not electronically readable is found problematic. 
The more so because the start of the period of validity is not shown on the EHIC. As in 
previous years, in 2016 the National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia – NFZ) 
of Poland identified cases in which the EHIC is used in order to enable an institution 
to settle the cost of medical benefits provided prior to the validity period of the card. 
An end date can, however, be found on the EHIC; the health insurance can end before 
this date. Data exchange on this matter is quite slow. Estonia mentioned that 
healthcare providers and competent institutions of other Member States should not 
accept the EHIC retrospectively and should ask for a replacement certificate of the 
EHIC. Austria also finds it problematic that invalid EHICs are not called in in some 
Member States. 
Secondly, the Netherlands reported that the form E 125 does not specify the cost 
and nature of the care provided. Health insurers therefore have to pay costs of 
benefits in kind without having insight into the care provided. This makes the use of 
the EHIC card sensitive to error and fraud. For example, it is not possible to see if the 
EHIC was presented for unplanned care or for planned care, whether or not 
consciously.  
Furthermore, Germany mentioned that in some States that apply the benefits-in-kind 
principle, there are still too few contracted healthcare providers to meet the demand 
for treatment based on the EHIC. This means that the EHIC is frequently not accepted 
in these States, and an application for reimbursement of costs must be submitted 
after the insured person has returned to Germany. 
Lastly, as in last year's report, the United Kingdom again reported on the problem of 
EHIC copycat websites.  
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3.6. Closing remarks 
Iceland and Norway had no specific problems to report. 
Specific problems in implementing the EU coordination rules Member States  
Regarding the (lack of) exchange of data between the Member 
States: 
 
The lack of/difficult exchange of data of facts that influence the 
entitlement to a benefit 
AT, BE, EE, ES, HR, IE, LT, PL, 
SK 
The lack of/unknown/inconsistent legal bases for the international 
exchange of data 
CH, IT 
Constraints of the national laws on the protection of personal data AT, CH, IT, PT 
Other ES 
Regarding cross-border investigation and cooperation in general:  
The lack of/difficulties regarding cooperation 
AT, CH, CZ, DK, HU, IE, IT, LT, 
NL, PL, RO 
The lack of procedures for the investigation of suspected cases of 
fraud and error across borders under the coordination rules 
DK, AT 
Constraints on national laws CH, RO 
Regarding the applicable legislation:  
The determination of the applicable legislation itself AT, FI, HU, MT, LV 
The determination of the place of residence / whether an undertaking 
is carrying out a significant part of its activity in the sending or 
posting state / of marginal work 
AT, BG, CZ, DK, ES, HU, LT, PL 
Problems arising from the use of PDs and SEDs AT, EL 
Problems arising from ignorance of beneficiaries regarding the 
applicable legislation 
BE 
Regarding the recovery of unduly paid benefits CH, PL 
Regarding the EHIC AT, DE, EE, IE, NL, PL, UK 
 
    Member States who replied to Q 2 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 2 
AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, HR, 
HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK 
LI, LU, UK 
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4. AGREEMENTS AND BILATERAL COOPERATION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The Member States have corrected, updated or completed Annex II of the 2016 report 
on fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination (reference year 2015) 
where necessary. The results can be found in Annex II of this year’s report.  
Most of the agreements concluded during the reference year 2016 concerned bilateral 
agreements regarding the electronic exchange of data on deceased pensioners. 
Several Member States also reported ongoing negotiations with the aim of concluding 
such agreements.  
No multilateral agreements were concluded in 2016. 
Please see Annex II for (1) an updated detailed summary of the reported 
bilateral/multilateral agreements and bilateral/multilateral cooperation arrangements12 
per country and (2) the updated detailed country sheets.  
Member States who replied to Q 3 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 3 
AT, BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, IE, IS, 
IT, LT, LV, NO, PL, PT, SK 
BG, CY, EL, LI, LU, MT, NL, RO, UK 
 
Closing remarks: 
Hungary proposes not to maintain the current country-specific content of Annex II, 
since it contains partly obsolete and not entirely relevant information. 
                                                 
12 An update of Annex II to the 2016 questionnaire on fraud & error in the field of EU social 
security coordination. 
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5. IN THE FIELD OF BENEFITS IN KIND, STEPS TAKEN IN THE 
REFERENCE YEAR (2016) TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE BY 
INSTITUTIONS AND HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS WITH THE 
COORDINATION RULES AND TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO 
CITIZENS 
The Member States have taken different steps to promote compliance by institutions 
and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to provide information to 
citizens in the field of benefits in kind. 
5.1. General steps taken to promote compliance by institutions 
and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to 
provide information to citizens in the field of benefits in kind 
Steps taken in 2016 to promote compliance with the coordination rules Member States 
by institutions:  
Informing of staff: AT, NO 
via circular letters or on the intranet BE, HR 
via circulars, guidelines BE, DE 
via letters by post HR 
via FAQs about handling cross-border situations in the scope of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
DE 
via using targeted information ES 
via seminars DE, PL 
via central contact points/online support IE 
Training of staff CH, DE, NO, UK 
E-learning modules CH, UK 
Workshops/working groups/meetings to discuss and find 
common solutions to problems relating to the coordination 
Regulations and to share information and good practices 
AT, DE, RO, UK 
by healthcare providers:  
Informing of healthcare providers: AT 
via website(s)  AT, DE, DK, NL, NO, PL 
via leaflets/brochures/posters AT, DE, UK 
via letters by post HR, NO 
via e-mail or phone MT, NO, UK 
via guidelines AT, IE 
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via personal advice and support EE, ES, PL 
Training of healthcare providers AT, CH, DE, EE, MT 
Encouraging to perform identity checks when the EHIC is 
presented by asking to see an official ID photo 
AT 
  
Steps taken in 2016 to provide information to citizens regarding the 
coordination rules: 
Member States 
Informing   
via website(s) 
AT, CH, DE, DK, EE, ES, HR, IE, 
LT, NL, NO, PL, RO, UK 
via brochures/flyers/folders/leaflets AT, DE, LT, PL 
via mail DE 
via the press AT, DE, EE, NO, PL, RO 
via radio/television programmes AT, MT, PL, RO 
via members’ magazines DE 
via magazines circulated to doctors’ practices AT 
via mobile application(s) IE 
via other mass communication measures LT, MT, RO 
via official centres for providing information/costumer services/call 
centres/online support 
EE, ES, IE, RO 
via the annual policy information of health insurance companies NL 
on an individual basis via telephone, in person or via letter/mail AT, DE, EE, PL, RO 
  
 
5.2. Specific steps taken to promote compliance by institutions 
and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to 
provide information to citizens in the field of benefits in kind 
A few of the steps taken to promote compliance by institutions and healthcare 
providers with the coordination rules and to provide information to citizens in the field 
of benefits in kind reported by the Member States are too specific to categorise in the 
table in chapter 5.1.  
In Austria for example, if contracted doctors charge private healthcare fees after 
unjustifiably refusing to accept an EHIC, they are required to explain themselves and 
there is subsequent reimbursement. 
Germany mentioned that healthcare providers are automatically informed by their 
respective national associations. However, the national association of statutory health 
insurance funds, DVKA, is in touch with its contacts in the healthcare providers' 
associations and supplies them with all the relevant information. It has worked 
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together with the various healthcare providers' associations to produce information 
leaflets on medical treatment for patients who are insured abroad. These leaflets are 
updated regularly and contain extensive information on the procedure for presenting 
the EHIC or the PRC. Service providers can obtain this information at www.dvka.de 
(click on “Leistungserbringer”). Healthcare providers also receive information from 
various German health insurance funds about dealing with the EHIC. 
In Ireland the Health Service Executive has systems in place to promptly identify 
deficiencies in data collection or inappropriate use of EHICs and provide feedback to 
healthcare providers, to ensure greater compliance in the future. 
5.3. Closing remarks 
Member States who replied to Q 4 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 4 
AT, CH, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, 
MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO 
BG, CY, CZ, EL, LI, LU, LV, SK, UK 
 
 
 Fraud and Error report 2017 
63 
 
6. BEST PRACTICES, LESSONS LEARNED, ISSUES OR CONCERNS 
(INCLUDING REGARDING PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION) WHEN 
DEALING WITH CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION AND INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF REGULATIONS (EC) NO 
883/2004 AND (EC) NO 987/2009 ON THE COORDINATION OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS  
Best practices, lessons learned and issues or concerns when dealing with cross-border 
cooperation and information exchange within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 
883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems, as 
reported by the Member States, are summarised hereinafter. A summary table of 
these best practices, lessons learned and issues or concerns can be found at the end 
of this section (p. 74). 
6.1. Best practices 
Starting with the reported best practices, a distinction between five categories can be 
made:  
6.1.1. Best practices regarding the cross-border cooperation and 
data exchange between Member States 
Several Member States (AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, EE, FI, HU, IE, IT, MT, PL, RO, SK) 
provided examples of best practices regarding cross-border cooperation and data 
exchange between Member States. A difference could be made between best practices 
related to cross-border cooperation, best practices related to the European Platform to 
combat cross-border social security fraud and error and best practices related to data 
exchange. 
Concerning the best practices related to cross-border cooperation, Austria for 
example reported that at irregular intervals inter-institution discussions are held with 
certain Member States, to improve the coordination of the rules. Also personal 
contacts with partners in other Member States have turned out to be very worthwhile 
in practice and have often led to solutions and uniform approaches. Italy mentioned 
that the level of cooperation with some institutions abroad is closer and more effective 
than with others, and that this cooperation helps to prevent cases of error or even 
fraud through the computerised transmission of applications and information, limiting 
human intervention and potential interference with the regularity of the production 
process. Malta stated that through cross-border cooperation most issues are 
managed without the need for contestations and litigations. 
Regarding the best practices related to the European Platform to combat cross-border 
social security fraud and error, Finland for example reported that the Platform has 
been helpful in many cases. The connections in other Member States in the field of 
social security are very valuable as the problematic cases are usually solved in a short 
time with help from a colleague from another Member State.  
 
According to Finland, networking among clerks in this field should be considered 
important and seminars and conferences should be organised more often for the 
clerks as well. 
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Udbetaling Danmark (DK) has had positive experiences with working together with the 
NCPs of e.g. Germany, Poland and Switzerland. Ireland stated that during 2016 the 
E-Platform has supported the NCP Network by providing forums for experts in the field 
of fraud and error within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, whereas 
specific groups were developed to discuss particular topics, e.g. the Pension Expert 
Group, the Employees Benefit Fraud Group, the Applicable Legislation and the Data 
Sharing Group. 
In the field of best practices related to data exchange, Malta for example mentioned 
that during the reference year, it continued to implement a fruitful data exchange 
exercise with the UK, which is the Member State where the largest amount of Maltese 
pensioners resides.  
 
Malta reports that similar agreements with other countries are in the pipeline. The 
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS) of Poland had positive experiences with 
the processing of applications for old-age and disability pensions with German 
competent institutions. Throughout the years KRUS has considerably improved its 
methods of cooperation with these institutions. Multiple meetings of representatives of 
Polish and German liaison bodies and competent institutions contributed to this to a 
large extent. Mutual agreements as well as exchange of information and experience 
helped to eliminate difficulties as well as improve the flow of information when 
processing old-age and disability cases.  
6.1.2. Best practices regarding data protection in the context of 
cross-border data exchange 
Like last year, as a best practice Spain reported the use of digital encryption methods 
to safeguard confidentiality and protect personal data when sharing data with 
institutions in other Member States. Croatia also reported that secure IT methods and 
tools providing the highest level of personal data protection are used for data 
exchange. 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this report, on 24 May 2016 Regulation 
(EC) No 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) entered into force. The new rules, 
however, will apply in the Member States only as from 25 May 2018, by which time 
the Member States will have to adapt their national legislations and raise awareness 
among public authorities and companies of the new aspects introduced.  
This exchange between Malta and the UK, which is based on a bilateral agreement, 
functions on the basis of an annual exchange of data on mutual pensioners residing in 
either country, and subsequent exchanges every 6 weeks. The information being 
exchanged includes the rate of the pension payable by either country in order to 
counteract cases of undeclared income, changes in marital status, as well as 
information about pensioners that passed away during the course of the year.   
The European Online Information System of the German Old-Age and Disability 
Insurance (EOA), to which KRUS has been given access, enables KRUS to use, on a 
regular basis, information about applicants’ German insurance history and the 
amount of German benefits received by them, which to a large extent facilitates 
examining applications for farmers’ old-age and disability benefits and accelerates the 
process of issuing decisions in such cases. 
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The Regulation constitutes an attempt to harmonise the privacy rules of the various 
States by defining a new common framework for all Member States of the European 
Union on the processing of personal data in the areas of prevention, combating and 
punishment of crimes. The implementation of the new legislation ensuring the same 
level of protection of personal rights with regard to data dissemination can, according 
to Italy, contribute effectively to preventing and combating fraud and error, including 
in matters of social security.  
6.1.3. Best practices regarding internal cooperation and data 
exchange 
A few Member States (CH, DK, FI, NL, NO) also reported on best practices regarding 
internal cooperation and data exchange which are performed in order to 
combat/prevent fraud and/or error.  
Switzerland mentioned as a best practice that in the absence of legal bases 
comparable to those existing for the Swiss Federal Law on Accident Insurance (LAI), 
some of the practices introduced by the Anti-Fraud Department of the DI Office are 
analysed and transferred to other sectors of the Central Compensation Office (Centrale 
de Compensation - CdC - CCO), specifically within the framework of the LFA-CdC 
working group. By way of example, raising awareness among operators in the benefits 
sector, and implementing an internal administrative procedure in the CCO are the 
result of the sharing of best practices and know-how by various sectors of the CdC 
(OAIE, OASI-benefits, Optional insurance and Disputes). 
Udbetaling Danmark (DK) believes that an increased use of data mining is an effective 
tool in combating fraud and error. It is their view that an increased use of objective 
data from registers will contribute to identifying cases and patterns of fraud as well as 
strengthen the due process to the advantage of the claimants, by streamlining to a 
greater extent the administration of social benefits across branches of social security 
on the basis of objective data. 
Finland indicated the existence and use of comprehensive and up-to-date registers 
(databases) in general (population register, business register etc) and also in the field 
of social insurance as a best practice, since this data can be checked when handling 
A1 certificates or checking the insurance of foreign workers. 
 
6.1.4. Best practices regarding the dissemination of information 
In the field of dissemination of information, Lithuania reported the measure “Clean 
hands”, in which is part of the Sectoral Programme for Prevention of Corruption in the 
Health System for 2015-2019. It is to determine the corruption index of personal 
healthcare institutions, which reflects the publicity and openness of healthcare 
institutions (patients’ access to information) and the implementation of corruption 
prevention measures, as a best practice. With the help of this corruption prevention 
measure healthcare institutions have become more open and informative for patients.  
The Social Insurance Bank (Socialeverzekeringsbank – SVB) of the Netherlands 
considers its International Verification Unit (IVU) to be a best practice. The results 
(recovery of unduly paid pensions/benefits) outweigh by far the cost of visiting their 
clients living abroad. Also Norway mentioned its officers who are specialised in 
detecting fraud regarding cash benefits of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Administration as a best practice. 
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It should be mentioned that as from 2017, the corruption index determination ratio 
will be applied in determining the amount of the variable component of remuneration 
for managers of healthcare institutions. According to the Law on Health Care 
Institutions of the Republic of Lithuania the monthly salary of the managers of public 
healthcare institutions and their deputies consists of a fixed and variable part. The 
amount of the fixed part of the monthly wage of the managers is established having 
regard to the level of performance of the institution, and is computed by multiplying 
the basic amount of the wage by the coefficient set forth in the law concerned. The 
variable part of the monthly salary depends on the performance of the institution 
during the previous calendar year, and is set for one year. Thus, in order to be paid a 
higher wage, managers of health institutions must seek better evaluation of their 
performance, since the level of corruption is included in the list of the performance 
indicators. 
Also Latvia reported on a best practice regarding the dissemination of information. 
The State Social Insurance Agency has organised meetings and events with the 
purpose of informing society about the implementation of the EU Regulations and the 
impact on pensions, and other benefits.  
6.1.5. Best practices regarding PDs, SEDs and other forms 
 
6.2. Lessons learned 
6.2.1. Regarding cross-border cooperation  
Belgium reported that a structured system with functional contacts is key in ensuring 
equal treatment of all (EU) citizens in an open-border Europe. Also a list of similar or 
closely related institutions would come in handy. For example, as a social inspector in 
Belgium, who can I contact in the other EU Member States who understands what I 
need and why? Each country has its own system and structures. There is no list of 
persons to contact with regard to a specific question. A lot of time and effort is 
required in order to find the right contact, if one is found at all. Even when successful, 
there is no guarantee that there will be any answer whatsoever. The Netherlands has 
a contact address, but it is difficult to obtain a response, nor is it specific for a social 
inspection. On the other hand, meetings have taken and will take place in the future in 
order to set up a more structured collaboration via bilateral agreements. Also with 
France a project has been set up in order to come to an agreement for better 
cooperation between the inspection services. A third project will be set up with 
Luxembourg in the future. 
In the context of the coordination of social security systems regarding family benefits, 
Italy mentioned the recent creation of the SED F003. Information about the payment 
of family benefits regarding the priority right could prove a useful tool, with the 
launch of EESSI, for preventing and combating fraud and error, both in 
unemployment benefits and family benefits. Accordingly, the new SED, confirming the 
payment of family benefits by the Member State of residence, shows any Italian 
welfare recipient residing in another Member State who has not communicated their 
transfer abroad despite their obligation to do so. 
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6.2.2. Regarding data exchange 
The Hungarian Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (CANPI) 
(pension benefits), has a well-functioning cooperation with other Member States’ 
counterpart organisations, especially with regard to data exchange on deaths. The 
CANPI is planning to further enhance the current methods of data exchange on death 
events (which is an international best practice taken up and followed by CANPI in this 
particular field), e.g. progressing from currently used technical data means to sPAD 
procedures in connection with Germany (the Member State with which Hungary has 
the most cases in this sector). This progress would certainly result in reducing the 
number and amount of undue payments. 
With regard to the exchange of information for the recognition of benefits, it is 
reiterated by Italy that its regularity is a prerequisite for ensuring EU citizens’ social 
security rights associated with freedom of movement in the EU, and for allowing the 
relevant institutions to carry out their tasks in a proper and uniform manner within a 
reasonable timeframe.  
 
Forms were exchanged electronically in the reporting year — Business Use Cases 
(BUCs) — with regard to family benefits and unemployment, which will prevent and 
resolve many of the current issues.  
Since 2016 the INPS has also been involved, together with the competent institutions 
of other Member States which apply EU legislation, in updating and optimising the 
database, i.e. the Repository (IR), which contains information on the social security 
institutions that are to use EESSI. This database will be a key instrument to correctly 
identify the institutions involved in the electronic exchange of forms, thus limiting the 
possibility of error in the transmission of files to foreign institutions that have no 
competence in the specific case. 
Pending the launch of the EESSI platform, which will ensure more structured 
information management, difficulties persist in the exchange of forms that are 
currently paper-based. Through the National Institute of Social Security (Istituto 
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, INPS) in 2016 Italy was involved in the 
completion of EESSI. It was an active part of the Consortium of Member States in the 
SAFE (Social Agencies for Future Europe) project, which aims to pilot the exchange of 
information between the institutions of the countries involved, through a prototype 
electronic platform, which is an important step towards the development of the 
EESSI.  
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6.2.3. Regarding the EHIC 
The United Kingdom reported that NHS Protect is aware of various instances of 
EHICs being used by individuals who have either never been resident in the UK (and 
who are not insured by the UK through other means), or by individuals who were no 
longer entitled to apply for, or use a UK EHIC. They have completed a major piece of 
work examining and identifying any areas for improvement on all their administrative 
systems relating to EEA healthcare payments, including the EHIC, with specific 
emphasis on fraud and error. They are now reviewing the potential opportunities 
identified by this work and examining steps to take to improve the system further 
through a more radical redesign of their EEA systems. They hope this will help them in 
being able to quantify the number of cases of fraud and error. 
They have already tightened the system and now require additional proofs of 
entitlement and residency. All applicants are required to confirm a mandatory 
declaration, which includes an acknowledgement of possible penalties for misuse. The 
acceptable proofs of entitlement and residency have also been tightened as a result. If 
such details are not provided the application is not processed. Individuals are also 
asked to sign a mandatory declaration stating that any significant changes in 
circumstances (that will have an effect on eligibility and/or entitlement) need to be 
disclosed. The declaration also clarifies that information from the form may be used by 
other NHS and government organisations for the purpose of the prevention, detection 
and investigation of fraud and error, including for the prosecution of fraud. If the 
declaration is not signed, the application is not processed further and the card is not 
issued.  
An e-mail registration portal was added to the online application process for EHICs, 
which means that applicants resident in the UK must provide an e-mail address and 
log in to access the application. This provides for further validation of the applicant 
and allows the NHS Business Services Authority (NHSBSA) to gather further insight 
into the practices of the fee-paying/copycat websites, like their IP address (which 
enables to monitor their activity and block them). This insight will be used in the 
future to identify ways of improving the service. Although e-mail registration is mainly 
to counter fee-paying websites, it also checks that online applications are not being 
made from abroad (as such applications should be made by post). E-mail verification 
applies only to online applications. 
The INPS is championing a plan to introduce in the EU the European Social Security 
Identification Number — ESSIN, to identify all workers at European level reliably and 
unambiguously, overcoming the differences that currently exist between one country 
and another without removing them, and thus permitting checks of the mobility of 
persons in the EU and the immediate exchange of information and data according to a 
common standard of transparency. As well as identifying persons and facilitating 
solutions in determining the legislation applicable, it could be a tool for ensuring the 
availability of social security information that would allow the quantification — at any 
moment and in any country — of all useful periods and contributions credited in order 
to benefit from various forms of social protection. This number could be the 
identification key used for the construction of a European computerised system which 
allows access to information held in national files for integrated management of the 
social security, labour and tax data of each entity. In this way, it would be easier to 
monitor migration flows, manage employment statuses and ensure the correct 
recognition of social security and welfare benefits, the application of fiscal legislation 
and the fight against the evasion of tax and social security contributions. 
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The UK is also in the process of producing a cross-government Fraud and Error Guide 
that will formalise the protocols currently in place and provide extra guidance for 
frontline staff on how to process clear cases of fraud and misuse of the system and 
recover funds. 
6.3. Issues and concerns 
6.3.1. Issues and concerns regarding cross-border cooperation and 
data exchange  
Although some best practices regarding cross-border cooperation and data exchange 
were already mentioned, several Member States (AT, BE, DK, MT, PL, RO, SK) also 
expressed some issues and concerns in this area.   
The Polish Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, 
Departament Rent Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) reported that the following issues were 
faced when dealing with cross-border cooperation and information exchange within 
the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the 
coordination of social security systems in the year 2016: 
- the reluctance of foreign institutions to cooperate with the liaison institution, 
competent institutions and the institutions of the place of residence; 
- failure by foreign competent institutions to respond to the official letters from 
the liaison institution, competent institutions and the institutions of the place of 
residence (total failure of deadlines or slow response); and 
- difficulties in determining the institution competent to consider the case. 
Based on the experiences of the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS) (PL) 
gained so far, the Italian, French, Greek and UK institutions are those most difficult to 
cooperate with. 
Also Austria stated that there are Member States with which there are recurrent 
problems with regard to cooperation. This may be because forms are only being 
issued, despite insurance periods being known, once insured persons make an 
application and because known facts are being denied, or because inquiries are 
answered either very tardily or not at all. Language barriers, which in some cases 
result in lengthy processing times, should also be mentioned as problematic in this 
respect. The cross-border enforcement of the statutory obligations of employers and 
workers, or of penalties in the case of offences, also remains very difficult. In 
particular, only a few claims for recovery in cases of abuse are successful. 
Consequently, close cooperation between the institutions concerned is essential where 
dealing with social security issues is concerned, because action or measures by the 
institution/authority of the State responsible may be impossible, or severely restricted, 
owing to inadequate cooperation and the consequent lack of evidence and information. 
The exchange of data on deaths with the pension service of Deutsche Post provides a 
positive example in this respect, in that overpayments following a death are largely 
being avoided. The inadequate exchange of data, by contrast, also brings with it the 
risk of social security abuse and fraud. The Conciliation Board procedure is reported as 
operating well, although here as well the question of actual enforceability remains 
open. Lastly, Austria reported that there is also a major problem with the practice of 
retroactive de-registration of long-term care in some Member States, because there is 
no provision in Austria for retroactive self-insurance for a lengthy period. 
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Romania reported that their National Agency for Employment makes necessary 
efforts to develop a good and tight cooperation with institutions from other Member 
States. More in particular, efforts are made in responding to requests to investigate 
possible entitlements to Romanian benefits of persons who are already recipients of 
similar or other benefits in the respective Member States. However, the outcomes of 
such cooperation are often hard to achieve as long as the requesting Member State 
cannot provide sufficient information enabling them to precisely identify the person 
subject to investigation.  
Malta stated that although data exchange in individual cases works very well, bulk 
data requests remain very difficult to establish, due to differences in privacy legislation 
and general restrictions.  
Related to the foregoing, Slovakia mentioned that the communication when 
exchanging information related to a person’s health condition is made easier by 
designating contact persons during bilateral negotiations and then using e-mail (e.g. 
with the Czech Republic, Austria, United Kingdom). Due to personal data protection 
rules the e-mail communication is limited to sending reminders, or exchanging basic 
information needed to solve concrete cases. Information related to persons, including 
their health condition, are sent by regular post to the postal address of the partner 
institution in question. This is found to be problematic. Slovakia is expecting much 
improvement and advancement after the introduction of EESSI. 
 
6.3.2. Other issues and concerns 
 
Belgium raised a concern regarding cross-border investigations. When a social 
inspectorate conducts an investigation, they often have to stop as soon as one of the 
persons involved claims to live across the border. In those cases, which the social 
inspectorates often encounter in border regions, they can no longer make inquiries 
such as a confirmation that that person actually lives in that specific country, whether 
s/he receives any social benefits, generates an income etc. This leads to an unequal 
treatment of similar cases where, when all those involved reside on the same territory, 
the matter would be fully investigated. Finally, it is sometimes difficult to establish 
whether a person has double citizenship/registration and/or benefits from multiple 
social security systems at the same time. 
Also Denmark mentioned the implementation of the future communications system 
EESSI as a hopefully possible solution for the need for a system of safe 
communication between Member States, since it is the view of Udbetaling Danmark 
that initiatives aiming at combating fraud and error are impeded by a lack of access 
to data from other Member States – both in relation to data exchange on a larger 
scale and in relation to concrete cases. Until EESSI is in place, Member States will 
continue to be challenged by this. 
Like previous years, Austria reported the PD A1 as another problem area, on the one 
hand owing to the possibility of its unrestricted retroactive issue (either through 
unawareness or delay at the institution concerned), and on the other hand to the lack 
of an actual enforceable possibility of challenging it, since a 'decision' can be taken 
only by agreement. The outcome of investigations at the place of work is often 
disregarded by the posting State, and in some cases there are even no comments in 
response to requests for the forms to be withdrawn. A modification of the dispute 
resolution procedure might be helpful here, in the shape of a specific obligation on 
the institution responsible to carry out checks where there are justified doubts. There 
also needs to be better communication between the institutions concerned, within 
shorter timeframes, by simple technical means.   
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Lastly, the Czech Republic reported an issue concerning pension benefits. In pension 
cases it occasionally comes to a controversial situation if the insured person (usually) 
lives in Austria, and the attending physician is also in Austria, but the claim for an 
invalidity pension is submitted in the Czech Republic, because that is the place of 
permanent residence of the insured person. In such cases it quite often happens that 
Austria demands the form E 213 CZ from the Czech Republic even if all the medical 
reports are available only in Austria (in German). In the Czech Republic the medical 
reports (sent from Austria) have to be translated from German into Czech. The form E 
213 CZ is produced in Czech and sent to Austria, where this form has to be translated 
again into German. Such procedure seems to be rather pointless, although strictly in 
accordance with Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009, if no other 
medical reports are available in the Czech Republic. 
6.4. Closing remarks 
Best practices Member States  
Regarding cross-border cooperation and data exchange:   
Inter-institution discussions at irregular intervals with Member States 
and personal contacts/direct meetings with partners in other Member 
States 
AT, BE, CH, EE, IT, MT, PL 
The computerised transmission of applications and information IT 
The European Platform to combat cross-border social security fraud 
and error 
DK, FI, IE 
Fruitful data exchange with other Member States MT 
Concluding bi- or multilateral agreements on data exchange PL 
Regarding data protection in the context of cross-border data 
exchange: 
 
Regulation (EC) No 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive (EC) No 95/46 (General Data 
Protection Regulation) 
IT 
The use of digital encryption methods/secure IT methods and tool ES, HR 
Regarding internal cooperation and data exchange   
The sharing of best practices between social security institutions CH 
The use of comprehensive and up to date registers and performing data 
mining activities on these registers 
DK, FI 
The use of specialised units for detecting fraud and error NL, NO 
Regarding the dissemination of information:  
The measure “Clean hands” as part of the Sectoral Programme for 
Prevention of Corruption in the Health System for 2015-2019 
LT 
Meetings and events with the purpose to inform society about the 
implementation of the EU Regulations 
LV 
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Regarding PDs, SEDs and other forms  
The creation of the SED F003; information about the payment of family 
benefits regarding the priority right 
IT 
Lessons learned Member States 
Regarding cross-border cooperation BE 
Regarding data exchange IT 
Regarding the EHIC UK 
Issues and concerns Member States 
Regarding cross-border cooperation and data exchange:  
The uncooperativeness of some Member States / a lack of cooperation 
between Member States / long handling times / no sufficient 
information 
AT, PL, RO 
Linguistic barriers AT 
Problems regarding cross-border enforcement AT 
The need for a system of safe communication between Member States DK, MT, SK 
Other issues and concerns:  
Regarding the PD A1 AT 
Regarding unequal treatment between purely national cases and cross-
border cases 
BE 
Regarding translation issues CZ 
 
Member States who replied to Q 6 Member States who refrained from replying to Q 6 
AT, BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HU, IE, IS, IT, 
LT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK 
BG, CY, EL, HR, LI, LU, UK 
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7. EXAMPLES OF, OR PROPOSALS OR SUGGESTIONS FOR MEASURES 
TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL TACKLING OF FRAUD AND ERROR IN 
THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SECURITY COORDINATION WHICH 
NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS CAN OPERATIONALISE WITHOUT THE 
NEED FOR CHANGES TO NATIONAL OR EU LAW 
7.1. Regarding cooperation and data exchange 
Austria reported that close cooperation between the Member States and institutions 
concerned is vital but also still open to improvement in the case of some States. 
Faster action and friction-free teamwork between the Member States concerned would 
be a substantially more promising scenario. Many Austrian institutions expect 
improvements as a result of the introduction of EESSI and the consequent possibility 
of faster data exchange.  
Italy noted that members of National Contact Points (NCPs) and other actors should 
be encouraged to make increased use of the European Platform to combat cross-
border social security fraud and error so that information and suggestions are shared 
more widely. A flexible and informal daily flow of information, views, practices and 
ideas would be ideal. To ensure more flexible use of the platform, it would also be 
useful if each country could enter data and receive feedback in its own language. The 
Social Insurance Bank (Socialeverzekeringsbank – SVB) of the Netherlands suggests 
that all NCPs always respond to posts on the NCP European Platform.  
 
Portugal suggested the promotion of regular meetings between NCPs and 
representatives of institutions and services with competence in the different areas of 
social security coordination, thus constituting an "internal network" with their NCP. 
Denmark mentioned that in order to improve the overall tackling of fraud and error 
International Health Insurances should either contact the relevant health providers or 
involve the national liaison bodies when they experience problems with the 
interpretation of the coordination rules, in order to resolve problems. 
To improve the overall tackling of fraud and error in the field of social security 
coordination, it is important to Latvia to improve information exchange by for 
example  new bilateral or multilateral agreements between the EU Member States (for 
example, agreements on the exchange of information about persons’ place of living 
(change of residence), employment periods, deaths etc). 
 
 
Norway stated that the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration takes part in 
the European Benefit Fraud Network Group, organised as a sub-group of the NCP 
network. This sub-group exchanges knowledge about methods, trends and examples 
that are of important value in tackling fraud and error, also in domestic cases. More 
such sub-groups should be established. 
In Malta’s opinion, the area which is most subject to cases of fraud and error is the 
area of the applicable legislation. Ideally, each Member State should adopt the best 
practices found in the Belgian system, which is the most focused in this area. Maybe a 
concerted effort at EU level in this regard could result to be very effective in 
combating fraud and error. 
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Finland stated that a European website with all the relevant information on how to 
insure a person in each Member State is needed. This could be achieved with the help 
of the NCPs from each Member State, who could collect the information and verify if 
this information could easily be understood by employers, employees and self-
employed persons. This information could then be published by e.g. the European 
Commission. Also Lithuania mentioned the spreading of information as an efficient 
measure to prevent fraud and error.  
7.2. Regarding Portable Document A1 
Austria reported that with regard to the issue of PDs A1, it would be desirable that 
there is an obligation to provide detailed information about inter-State facts, including 
a binding declaration to confirm that the data is accurate and complete. 
 
7.3. Regarding the EHIC 
With regard to the EHIC, according to Austria it makes sense to point out to 
healthcare providers on a regular basis that they should check the identity of patients 
who are being treated temporarily. In addition, EHICs should be made electronically 
readable in future and/or the full period of validity should be visible directly on the 
card.   
It was reported by the Polish Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń 
Społecznych, Departament Rent Zagranicznych – ZUS DRZ) for consideration that the 
provisions on the coordination of social security systems should be more precise and 
should not allow for different interpretation by various Member States. The Practical 
Guide, which is intended to be an interpretation of the rules, often creates doubts 
itself (e.g. the amount of turnover of the posting undertaking). In addition, ZUS has 
asked to consider building a thematic (held on the European Platform to combat 
cross-border social security fraud and error) database covering good practices 
referring to other issues identified by the Member States and reported over the years 
both in the context of the questionnaire to this report (and maybe also the 
questionnaires themselves accompanied with the statistical reports per reference 
year) and other AC notes. This database could be supplied by a kind of library with all 
the respective FreSsco reports and any other EU or international documents referring 
to issue of preventing or combating fraud and error in the field of EU social security 
coordination. 
To prevent any cases of irregularity/fraud, the elimination of Portable Document U1 
and the preferred use of SED U001 was again proposed by Italy as a radical solution 
to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, and via the latter to the Administrative 
Commission, pending the amendment of the document to put personal data on each 
page, given that it does not guarantee exchange of information between the 
respective institutions in accordance with the provisions of EU regulations. Pending 
possible elimination, consideration should be given to the possibility of setting up a 
shared database for consulting the forms in question, even though the launch of 
EESSI could solve these issues. 
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8. STATISTICS ON FRAUD AND ERROR IN THE FIELD OF EU SOCIAL 
SECURITY COORDINATION (REFERENCE YEAR 2016) 
8.1. Introduction 
As mentioned before, for this year's report, a new approach to the collection of 
statistical information was agreed, as quantitative data were collected by the thematic 
questionnaires launched within the framework of the Administrative Commission. The 
aim of this new approach was to obtain more detailed figures and a higher response 
rate among the Member States on the assumption that the competent institution 
which fills out the thematic questionnaire is also capable of replying to the quantitative 
questions on fraud and error. Despite this new approach still only a few Member 
States provided quantitative data. The response rate also strongly varies among the 
thematic questionnaires.  
It follows that some caution is required when drawing general conclusions. These 
fragmented data nonetheless give an indication of the size of fraud and error in the 
field of EU social security coordination as well as an overview of some types of fraud 
and error. It is hoped that by obtaining a higher response rate in the following years 
some of the preliminary findings can be confirmed or perhaps even denied.  
The questions on fraud and error are standardised in the thematic questionnaires and 
ask Member States to quantify the number of cases identified as well as the amount 
involved. Furthermore, Member States are invited to describe more in detail patterns 
of behaviour, types of inappropriate use of the EU provisions and types of error with 
reference to both citizen and institutional error.  
8.2. Applicable legislation 
Cases of fraud and error concerning the applicable legislation are reported by Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia and Iceland. 
Several infractions of the conditions determined by Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 (i.e. posting) and Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (i.e. pursuit of 
an activity in two or more Member States) have been reported: 
 no direct relationship between the posted worker and the employer; 
 no substantial activities in the sending Member State, the employer only makes 
use of posting, inappropriate statements of the domestic activity, letterbox 
companies, etc; 
 posted workers replace each other; 
 false PDs A1;            
 incorrect information provided by the applicant; 
 bogus self-employment: wrong status of the person concerned; 
 circumventing the application of Article 12: false evidence that Article 13 
instead of Article 12 should be applied; 
 fraudulent use of Article 13(3). 
 
76 
 
Only a few Member States were able to provide more detailed information on these 
infractions. For instance, Luxembourg and Slovakia are aware of cases of fraud 
regarding the application of Article 13(3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. This article 
states that a person who pursues an activity as an employed person and an activity as 
a self-employed person in different Member States is subject to the legislation of the 
Member State in which the person pursues an activity as an employed person. In 
some cases there are doubts whether the activity as employed person is really carried 
out.  
Furthermore, data was reported on the number of PDs A1 withdrawn (Table 1). In 
absolute figures, the highest number of PDs A1 were withdrawn by Poland (2,050 PDs 
A1). However, this Member State also issued the highest number of PDs A1 in 2016. 
In relative terms (i.e. as a share in the total number of PDs A1 issued) all Member 
States which provided figures withdrew less than 1% of the total number of PDs A1 
issued in 2016. For instance, Poland withdrew 0.4% of the total number of PDs A1 it 
issued in 2016. However, it should be noted that (also/especially) PDs A1 issued in 
2015 or even earlier could be withdrawn in 2016. Figures on the number of PDs A1 
withdrawn from the perspective of the receiving Member State were also asked. 
However, no such figures were provided. No figures were collected on the number of 
requests by receiving Member States to withdraw a PD A1. This is probably a figure 
more easily provided than the number of PDs A1 withdrawn. Only Denmark reports 
that the French authorities have requested Denmark to withdraw 18 PDs A1 in 2017.  
Table 1 Number of PDs A1 withdrawn, 2016 
 Number of PDs A1 withdrawn  
(as competent MS) 
Total number of PDs A1 
issued in 2016 
% of withdrawn PDs A1 
in 2016 
DK 6* 29,595 0.02% 
HU 529 65,725 0.8% 
PL 2,050 513,972 0.4% 
PT 300 64,459 0.5% 
IS 1 239 0.4% 
* However, Denmark states that it is still in the process of talking with the French authorities and
 the company. So they have actually not been withdrawn yet. 
Source Administrative data PD A1 Questionnaire 2017 
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To what extent foreign service providers commit violations to the applicable rules can 
be analysed by confronting the number of audits or investigations to the number of 
cases identified. Only Belgium has provided detailed information on this (see also 
section 2.2.2). Such kind of information is also reported in the annual reports of 
labour inspectorates.  
Finally, cases of error concerning the applicable legislation were reported as a result of 
mistakes in determining the legal basis and the competent Member State as well as 
the issue of incomplete PDs A1. 
8.3. Cross-border healthcare 
8.3.1. Unplanned necessary healthcare 
8.3.2. Inappropriate use of the EHIC 
Many Member States13 reported cases of fraudulent use of the EHIC. Most of the 
reported cases refer to the inappropriate use of the EHIC by persons who were not or 
are no longer insured. Furthermore, cases of inappropriate use of counterfeited EHICs 
were reported by Poland. The United Kingdom reported that they are still aware of 
copycat websites charging for advice related to the use of the EHIC. In the past this 
was also the case for Ireland. Finally, cases of error were reported by Poland, Portugal 
and Romania. 
A number of Member States were able to quantify the inappropriate use of the EHIC 
(Table 2). Out of this group, Austria reported the highest number of cases of 
inappropriate use. Those reported cases could be compared to the total 
reimbursement claims (E125 forms). In relative terms, Estonia (3% of the amount 
reimbursed) and Lithuania (2% of the amount reimbursed) are confronted with the 
highest impact. 
Table 2 Number of cases of inappropriate use of the EHIC, 2016 
 Total number of cases 
identified 
Total amount 
involved (in €) 
Share in total number of 
claims paid 
Share in total amount 
reimbursed** 
CZ A few hundred  0.2%  
EE 193 175,297 2.8% 3.0% 
LT 284 134,209 3.5% 2.0% 
NL More than 100 cases 85,757 0.1% 0.02% 
AT 791 189,868 0.8% 0.8% 
RO* 315 212,924 1.0% 0.6% 
* RO: includes cases of fraud and error. 
Source Administrative data EHIC Questionnaire 2017 
8.3.3. Invoice rejection 
Most of the rejections of an invoice issued or received by the E125 form/SED S080 are 
the result of an invalid EHIC at the moment of treatment or an incomplete E125 form. 
It also appears that some competent institutions even refuse to settle the claim on the 
grounds that the date of issue of the EHIC was later than the start of treatment or 
than the end of the treatment period. 
                                                 
13 The Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
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The main reasons reported to refuse an invoice were: 
 Invalid EHIC at the moment of treatment (= person not insured in the 
competent Member State): 
o expired EHIC; 
o date of treatment before EHIC was issued. 
 Incomplete E125 form:  
o wrong personal ID number; 
o missing EHIC ID number; 
o invalid EHIC ID number; 
o insufficient information concerning the EHIC. 
 Duplication of claims. 
 
A total number of twelve Member States were able to quantify the number of rejected 
invoices by their institutions or other institutions. Those cases could be compared with 
the total number of claims for reimbursement received or issued by an E125 form. The 
share of rejected invoices compared to the total claims of reimbursement received is 
on average 2.4% (Table 3). However, this percentage varies markedly among the 
reporting Member States. For instance, about 7% of the claims issued by Germany 
were rejected and about 2% of the claims it received. Also a higher number of claims 
for reimbursement issued by Norway (6.3%), France (3.3%) and the United Kingdom 
(3.3%) were rejected by the competent institutions in other Member States. From the 
perspective of the competent Member States, Croatia rejected 5.9% of the claims it 
received in 2016. Compared to 2015 the percentage of rejections has increased 
significantly.  
Table 3 Number of rejections of invoices, 2016 
MS Rejections by 
institutions in 
other countries 
Share of 
rejections in 
total 
reimbursement 
claims issued 
Rejections in 
2015 
Rejections by 
your institutions 
Share of 
rejections in 
total 
reimbursement 
claims received 
Rejections in 
2015 
CZ 500 1.1% 1.5% 500 1.2% n.a. 
DK 73 0.7% n.a. 84 0.4% 0.1% 
DE 29,000 6.8% 5.2% 12,000 2.2% 2.3% 
EE 50 0.3% 0.0% n.a. n.a. 0.2% 
FR 3,874 3.3% n.a. 6,438 2.1% n.a. 
HR 906 0.9% 0.4% 855 5.9% 3.6% 
CY 47 0.9% 0.6% n.a. n.a. 0.5% 
SI 159 1.1% 1.6% 519 2.7% 2.7% 
FI  1-2% 1 - 2% n.a. n.a. 1 - 2% 
UK 382 3.3% 1.9% 3,682 n.a. n.a. 
IS 40 1.2% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
NO 70 6.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total*   2.4% 1.4%  2.4% 1.3% 
* Unweighted average of the reporting Member States. 
Source Administrative data EHIC Questionnaire 2017 
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8.3.4. Planned cross-border healthcare 
Most reporting Member States are not aware of cases of fraud and error related to 
planned cross-border healthcare, in particular with regard to the use of PD S2.14 Only 
Romania and Austria reported some cases of fraud and error. 
8.3.5. Entitlement to healthcare by persons residing in a Member 
State other than the competent Member State 
Spain has detected cases of pensioners insured in another Member State who are not 
registered in the competent institution in Spain although they have received a PD S1. 
As a result these pensioners are currently insured in Spain solely on the basis of their 
residence. In case healthcare is provided to these pensioners no claim of 
reimbursement will be sent by Spain although it is not the competent Member State. 
Collaborative arrangements have been made for the exchange of information on 
pensioners with Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to determine the 
competent State. This resulted in the detection of 220 persons insured by Germany 
and 376 persons insured in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a limited number of 
cases of fraud and error were reported by Austria, Poland, Greece and Iceland. For 
instance, Poland reports that in some cases the PDs S1 it received are incomplete or 
applicable to persons who do not reside in Poland. In addition, in several cases Poland 
refused to issue a PD S1 when persons were not insured in Poland. 
8.4. Unemployment benefits 
8.4.1. Export of unemployment benefits 
In order to receive the unemployment benefit in another Member State, the 
unemployed person has to fulfil several conditions before leaving and on arrival. Some 
Member States report that these conditions are not always fulfilled. Latvia reports that 
persons are not always properly informed by their competent Member State on the 
export of unemployment benefits. As a consequence, unemployed persons sometimes 
leave the Member State without requesting a PD U2, which was confirmed by Greece, 
Cyprus, Hungary and Slovakia. Moreover, Greece reports that unemployed persons do 
not always register with the employment services of the receiving Member State 
within seven days. These cases might suggest that unemployed persons are not 
sufficiently aware of their rights and duties and highlight the importance of raising 
awareness. If they are not aware of these rights/duties, they might also fail to 
assert/fulfil them when they move to another Member State without a PD U2. 
Moreover, there is the risk that even competent institutions do not know this right to 
export unemployment benefits. 
Although the conditions to export unemployment benefits are not always fulfilled, 
almost all reporting Member States are not aware of cases of inappropriate use of the 
PD U2.15 Only Norway revealed 11 cases where the beneficiaries took up employment 
while still receiving an unemployment benefit. 
                                                 
14 This is the case for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Croatia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein.  
15 Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Iceland and Norway.  
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8.4.2. Aggregation of periods for unemployment benefits 
France, Slovakia, Finland and Hungary report significant delays in receiving the PD U1. 
Furthermore, some cases of fraud and error were reported by the Czech Republic, 
France, Hungary, Slovakia and Finland. The main remark made by the reporting 
Member States is that information provided by institutions is incomplete. For instance, 
the PD U1 does not contain all necessary information on periods of insurance and 
wages. Moreover, differences exist in the information provided by the PD U1, payslips, 
labour contracts, and the Structured Electronic Documents. Hungary and the Czech 
Republic report that they have detected some cases of unemployed persons who 
started to work abroad neglecting to notify about it. Only the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Spain quantified the number of cases and the amount involved (Table 4). These 
cases of fraud and error are compared to the total number of PDs U1 received. 
Table 4 Number of cases of fraud and error identified in case of 
aggregation of periods for unemployment benefits, 2016 
 Number of cases identified Amount involved  
(in €) 
% of total PDs U1 
received 
CZ 41 3,925 7.9% 
HU 88 6,077 4.5% 
ES More than ten  0.3% 
Source Administrative data PD U1 Questionnaire 2017 
8.5. Old-age, survivors’ and invalidity pensions 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Romania and Latvia have provided 
information on fraud and error in case of the application of the EU provisions on old-
age, survivors’ and invalidity pensions.  
These Member States reported several types of fraud and error: 
 payment of pension rights after the death of pensioners whose rights were 
exported abroad; 
 pensioners submitting false or incorrect information (for instance, incorrect civil 
status or income declaration); 
 falsifying life certificates. 
 
Especially the payment of a pension even after the death of the pensioner remains a 
risk. This can happen due to the death occurring in the period between annual checks 
carried out through life certificates and because relevant institutions abroad or 
relatives of the deceased have informed the competent institutions late or failed to 
inform them. In order to avoid this risk some Member States exchange data. For 
instance, Belgium electronically exchanges data on the date of death with Germany 
and France. Also Germany carries out automatic death data cross-checks for 
pensioners residing in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several such death data cross-checks 
were conducted in the 2015 reporting period. Finally, a similar initiative is reported by 
Poland.  
As reported by Germany, fraud and error may be countered by continuing the mutual 
information under Article 76(4) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, whereby the 
institution of the place of residence and the institutions concerned reinforce the 
exchange of information about changes in the personal circumstances of pensioners. 
This applies, for example, to a change of address, the taking up of employment or 
information on marital status in respect of surviving dependants. 
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In 2016, the International Verification, a unit within the Social Insurance Bank 
(Socialeverzekeringsbank – SVB) of the Netherlands, visited 882 old-age pension and 
survivor’s benefit clients in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great-Britain, Greece, 
Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Irregularities with regard to the amount 
paid were found in 210 cases or in 24% of the audits. Furthermore, Romania has 
detected 21 cases of fraud and error in 2016. 
8.6. Family benefits 
Several types of fraud and error were identified by Belgium, Germany, Poland and 
Romania in cases where a family benefit is exported abroad: 
 not informing (or informing very late) about changes affecting the right to 
family benefits (hiding facts about employment, the income situation of the 
family); 
 the composition of the household reported does not correspond with the real 
situation; 
 fictitious salaried or self-employed activities. 
Finland, Malta, Latvia and Ireland are not aware of any cases of fraud and error. This 
is in contrast to Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania (Table 5). Mainly 
for Belgium and Poland the detected cases of fraud and error cover a relatively high 
amount. Nonetheless, these cases of fraud and error are ‘only’ 4% and 2% of the total 
amount exported by Poland and Belgium, respectively.   
Some 27% of the amount reported by Poland relate to cases of fraud, of which most 
are linked to not informing the competent institution about changes affecting the right 
to family benefits. This is also the main reason for cases of error. 
Table 5 Cases of fraud and error in case of export of family benefits, 
2016 
 Cases Amount involved % exported cases % exported amount 
CZ* 199 € 127,065 21% 12% 
PL 4,033 € 1,389,404 12% 4% 
RO 998  7%  
* CZ: only cases of error.  
Source Administrative data Questionnaire on the export of family benefits 2017 
8.7. Maternity and equivalent paternity benefits 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta 
and Iceland are not aware of cases of fraud and error regarding the payment of 
maternity and equivalent paternity benefits. Only Germany reported that it has closed 
255 cases in 2014 and 2015.  
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8.8. Recovery of outstanding contributions and unduly paid 
benefits 
According to Article 84 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Articles 78 to 85 of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 a request for the collection of contributions and the 
recovery of unduly paid benefits can be submitted. A questionnaire on recovery 
procedures was launched within the framework of the Administrative Commission to 
collect these data. These are reported and analysed in a separate thematic report.16  
The number of requests for recovery issued and received are for most Member States 
fairly limited. Most of the requests for recovery of outstanding contributions are 
submitted by the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. In general, most of the requests 
for recovery of unduly paid benefits concern family benefits. Mainly Luxembourg has 
submitted a strikingly high number of requests for recovery of unduly paid family 
benefits. The number of requests for recovery of unduly paid family benefits could also 
be compared to the total number of family benefits paid within the context of the 
application of the EU rules on the coordination of social security systems. The results 
show that a high percentage of family benefits exported abroad has to be recovered 
afterwards. This is mainly the case for Slovakia. 
8.9. Quantitative data: Conclusions 
Several Member States provided statistics on the number of cases of fraud and error 
in the field of EU social security coordination. Others could not quantify the size of 
these cases but were sometimes able to describe in more detail the types of 
inappropriate use of the EU provisions. The table below gives a summary overview of 
these responses. From these data, it can be concluded that most of the reporting 
Member States did not detect cases of fraud and error with regard to the EU 
provisions on planned cross-border healthcare, healthcare provided to persons 
residing in a Member State other than the competent Member State, the export of 
unemployment benefits and finally maternity and equivalent paternity benefits. This is 
in contrast to the EU provisions on applicable legislation, unplanned necessary 
healthcare and old-age pensions. 
  
                                                 
16 De Wispelaere, F. and Pacolet, J. (2017), Report on recovery procedures, Network Statistics FMSSFE, 
European Commission. 
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Table 6 Cases of fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination reported by Member States, 2016 
  Applicable 
legislation 
Cross-border healthcare Unemployment Old-age, survivors' 
and invalidity 
pensions 
Family 
benefits 
Maternity and 
equivalent 
paternity benefits 
   Unplanned 
necessary 
healthcare 
Planned cross-border 
healthcare 
Residing in a MS other 
than the competent MS 
Export of 
unemployment 
benefits 
Aggregation of periods 
for unemployment 
benefits 
   
BE YES      YES YES  
BG     NO NO YES  NO 
CZ YES YES NO   YES   NO 
DK YES NO NO    YES   
DE  YES     YES YES YES 
EE  YES       NO 
IE     NO   NO NO 
EL    YES YES     
ES  YES   NO  YES   
FR    NO  YES    
HR   NO NO NO NO   NO 
IT         NO 
CY  NO  NO     NO 
LV     NO  YES NO  
LT  YES NO NO     NO 
LU YES         
HU YES   NO NO YES NO   
MT  NO  NO NO NO  NO NO 
NL YES YES NO  NO NO    
AT  YES YES YES      
PL YES YES  YES NO NO  YES  
PT  YES        
RO  YES YES    YES YES  
SI   NO       
SK YES YES   NO YES    
FI  NO  NO NO YES NO NO  
SE  NO NO NO NO     
UK  YES   NO     
IS YES YES NO YES NO NO   NO 
LI  NO NO NO  NO    
NO  YES  NO YES     
CH  YES        
No. YES 9 15 2 4 2 5 7 4 1 
No. NO  6 9 10 14 7 2 4 10 
Source Administrative data from the thematic questionnaires
  
9. ADDITIONAL REMARKS 
 
 
Belgium seems to be clearly in favour of strengthening Article 91 of the Implementing 
Regulation.17 
The United Kingdom added many additional remarks. Some of them were inserted 
infra, others were too broad to fit in one of the chapters and are therefore mentioned 
hereinafter: 
                                                 
17 Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying 
down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems, OJ L 284, 30.10.2009. 
The Central Compensation Office (Centrale de Compensation – CdC - CCO) of 
Switzerland additionally remarked that attention should be drawn to the judgment 
in the case Vukota-Bojic versus Switzerland delivered late 2016 by the European 
Court of Human Rights, of which the repercussions for the LFA have not yet been 
clearly determined. At the same time, the revision of the Swiss Federal Law on the 
General Part of Social Insurance (Loi fédérale sur la partie générale des assurances 
sociales, LPGA), rescheduled for early 2017, offers a range of opportunities:  
 to provide a definition of ‘insurance fraud’ specific to the social insurance 
covered by the LPGA (e.g. by inserting the appropriate wording in Chapter 2, 
such as a new Article 13b LPGA or an equivalent solution); 
 to provide a framework for action procedures while laying down a standard 
legal mandate, particularly as concerns the OASI and the DI (e.g. through a 
draft article broader in scope than the current Article 59(5) LAI);  
 introducing an integrated legal basis in the Swiss legal system to clarify the 
roles and points of access in the framework of electronic exchange of data with 
foreign countries (e.g. the simplification of the legal aspects relating to the 
establishment of exchanges of dates of death with Switzerland’s partners from 
the States party to the FMPA). 
Belgium added an additional remark. It stated that the difficulty/weakness linked to 
the annual fraud and error questionnaire is that, unlike other theme-based 
questionnaires, it is not compulsory. It is therefore difficult to gather data for the 
different areas of social security and to encourage the institutions to invest in the IT 
needed for this exercise. A further difficulty also stems from the fact that each 
national institution gathers data specific to it (depending on its specific needs, 
national legal restrictions imposed in Belgium for example via management 
contracts). There is no coordination between social security institutions as regards the 
data to be gathered in order to implement European rules on the coordination of 
social security systems. Belgium is therefore in favour of a legal basis being added to 
the coordination rules that obliges Member States to gather the relevant data in a 
specific format for purposes of comparison. Only in this way will it be possible to 
obtain the relevant data that can then be compared at European level, to draw 
conclusions and to try to assess the scale of fraud and error in the EU in the context 
of the implementation of the rules on the coordination of social security systems. 
Furthermore, some questions would require a longer reporting period, as the adoption 
of new legal provisions at national level often takes quite a significant amount of 
time.  
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The National Health Service (NHS) in the UK 
Healthcare in the UK is a devolved function, which means that different healthcare 
systems operate in England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar. Entitlement 
to free NHS hospital treatment in the UK is based on the individual being ‘ordinarily 
resident’, not on nationality or the payment of UK taxes or national insurance 
contributions. A person will be ‘ordinarily resident’ in the UK when that residence is 
lawful, adopted voluntarily and for settled purpose as part of the regular order of his or 
her life for the time being, whether of short or long duration.   
There is no standard or centralised register of people who are ordinarily resident in the 
UK at any given time, and this means that there may be occasions where patients are 
not charged for their care when they should be, either as a result of fraud or error. There 
is anecdotal evidence of some EEA residents travelling to the UK specifically to access 
services who do not have an EHIC or an S2. However, in 2015 the NHS introduced new 
regulations, which were updated in 2016, which apply to all courses of treatment 
commenced on or after that date.  
These regulations place a legal obligation on NHS Trusts, NHS foundation trusts and local 
authorities in the exercise of public health functions in England, to establish whether a 
person is an overseas visitor to whom charges apply, or whether they are exempt from 
charges. The role of Overseas Visitors Manager is established in the NHS to ensure that 
those patients who are not exempt from charges make a fair contribution for the care 
they receive. 
The S2 route 
For the S2 route the main risk of fraud comes from submission of falsified documents to 
either prove settled residence or prove UK NHS consultant support. 
The documents that the decision-making body particularly scrutinises are: 
 bank statements,  
 utility bills, 
 tenancy agreements, 
 NHS Consultant support letters. 
Where these are unsatisfactory, the administrators ask for more evidence and/or reject 
the application.  
The decision-making body does not specifically collate information on numbers of claims 
rejected in these circumstances or the potential amounts, although it is recorded with 
each application. 
There are underlying concerns which have prompted our attention, which are currently 
under investigation, relating several applications with issues about: 
 accurate translation of medical information; 
 fraudulent medical support information to assist applicants to access treatment 
not available under the NHS; 
 the ability for applicants to enter a financial arrangement with a provider whereby 
they pay a lesser fee than the invoice presented. 
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Lichtenstein reported they do not have knowledge about any cases of fraud and/or 
error.   
Luxemburg reported that as the reporting on fraud and error is voluntary, Luxembourg 
decided not to take part for the reference year 2016.  
 
 
Fraud and Error report 2017 
87 
 
10. CONCLUSION 
In line with the reports of previous years, this report reveals that generally, despite the 
various steps taken by the Member States in order to prevent and combat fraud and 
error and the obvious constantly growing awareness concerning the necessity to tackle 
cross-border social security fraud and error, there is still room for improvement. The 
Member States have reported a diverse range of measures undertaken – with varying 
intensity – in order to tackle fraud and error in general and within the different branches 
of social security specifically. In spite of these differences amongst Member States as 
concerns fraud and error, however, the reported measures are demonstrative of the 
continued willingness of the Member States to tackle these practices, as was the case in 
2016.18 With the foregoing in mind, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Regarding the steps taken throughout the reference year (2016) to prevent and or 
combat fraud and error in cases determined under the Regulations,19 it can primarily be 
concluded that a distinction between steps taken to prevent/combat fraud and steps 
taken to prevent/combat error is rarely made. Often, the reported measures have the 
dual intent to combat fraud as well as error. The steps taken to combat and/or prevent 
fraud and error, reported by the Member States can be categorised into four major 
categories: 
1. steps regarding information dissemination; 
2. steps regarding controlling and monitoring actions; 
3. steps regarding cooperation and data exchange; 
4. steps regarding the recovery of unduly paid benefits. 
Starting with the steps taken regarding information dissemination, it is notable that in 
the area of prevention and detection of fraud and error, several Member States still put 
lots of efforts in information dissemination, in order to promote compliance by 
institutions and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to provide 
information to citizens.20 It is the view of the authors of this report that information 
dissemination is an important step in the prevention of fraud and error. When citizens 
and other stakeholders involved have better knowledge about the coordination rules and 
the resulting rights and obligations, less errors will occur. The same goes for the staff of 
social security institutions and other parties involved in the application of the 
coordination rules. Moreover, information dissemination is also a substantial step to 
ameliorate the fight against fraud and error, since the staff of social security institutions 
and other parties involved in the application of the coordination rules who are better 
acquainted with the matter will detect cases of fraud and/or error earlier and will know 
how to deal with these cases. We therefore encourage the European Commission and the 
Member States to keep making improvements towards information dissemination, just 
like they did during the current and previous reference years. 
                                                 
18 It needs be noted that these findings can, however, only be compared to foregoing studies in a highly limited 
manner, as the focal points of foregoing studies do not necessarily correspond with the focal point of the 
current report. 
19 Cfr. Chapter 2. 
20 Cfr. 2.1.1.1. 
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Secondly, concerning the steps taken regarding controlling and monitoring actions, it is 
clear that Member States keep on trying to make improvements.21 The implementation of 
regular checks and monitoring activities is a substantial step in the prevention of and 
fight against fraud and error. Data matching and data mining are found to be very useful 
techniques to partly fulfil these tasks. In first instance, in order to be able to fully make 
advantage of these techniques, extensive corresponding databases and registers are 
needed. The authors of this report therefore encourage the Member States to keep 
establishing, improving and updating their databases and registers and to facilitate 
consultation of these databases and registers by relevant parties, if possible even by 
institutions of other Member States etc. The creation of a central register of PDs A1 was 
for example found to be very useful.  
When extensive databases and registers are available, the techniques of data mining and 
data matching can simplify the processes of risk profiling, risk management and risk 
targeting. By using these processes cases of fraud or error can be prevented or detected 
early. The authors of this report would like to emphasise to the Member States that, 
although risk profiling, risk management and risk targeting surely have positive effects 
towards preventing and even combating fraud and error, they should always be aware of 
the fact that some risk profiles or cases of fraud can slip through the net and that risk 
targeting can lead to the relocation of the fraud by the perpetrators towards fields that 
are not targeted. Member States may not be blinkered by the results of these processes. 
They have to keep looking at fraud and error with an open mind, next to the 
aforementioned IT processes. The authors of this report would also like to encourage the 
Member States to make further implementations on electronic payment control systems, 
since they are very effective in preventing fraud and error. The creation of new or the 
update of already existing reporting tools can be seen as a very helpful tool for 
controllers and/or investigators in the fight against fraud and error. It is clear that 
various Member States have a vast amount of know-how on all the abovementioned 
processes at their disposal. The authors of this report suggest that Member States share 
their know-how, best practices, lessons learned and remaining issues so that all the 
Member States could reach the same level of progress. While exchanging this know-how, 
best practices, lessons learned and remaining issues new insights will be revealed and 
existing systems and processes will be further developed. Very often, Member States 
struggle with questions other Member States also struggle with, or have been struggling 
with and have already resolved. Also in such cases it is clear that cross-border 
cooperation and information exchange can boost efficiency and economise resources 
often too scarce. Lastly, the authors of this report find that little or no European or 
international inspection and monitoring actions in the fight against fraud and error were 
reported by the Member States. Joined checks with social inspectorates or other 
institutions from other Member States were for example not reported, although joined 
checks were held at the Benelux level. On 3 October 2014 the Benelux Member States 
concluded the Treaty of Liège, a Benelux Treaty on the cooperation in the field of road 
transport inspections. On 13 August 2017 a first common inspection (Belgium and the 
Netherlands) took place and was highly successful. On 23 September 2015 the Benelux 
Committee of Ministers issued the Recommendation concerning the development of a 
multilateral cooperation in the fight against cross-border social fraud at the Benelux and 
European levels. On 18 March 2016 the Declaration of Intentions on further collaboration 
of the Benelux Interparliamentary Assembly, the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council 
on the development of a multilateral cooperation to promote fair labour and to fight 
social security fraud was adopted. On 17 May 2016, Dutch and Belgian inspection 
services inspected a temporary work agency that is mainly active in the construction 
sector in a cross-border context.  
                                                 
21 Cfr. 2.1.1.2 and 2.2.1.1. 
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Since still most of the controlling and monitoring actions happen at the national level, a 
close cooperation and data exchange between the Member States is needed. Concerning 
the foregoing, it is plain that Member States keep on trying to improve the 
communication (including data exchange) and cooperation between internal competent 
authorities as well as the competent authorities in other Member States and are still 
willing to take the necessary steps to fulfil these intentions.22 The fact that intra and 
international cooperation and data exchange are a conditio sine qua non in the process of 
preventing and combating fraud and error in the field of social security coordination, does 
not need further explanation. The reported steps show the eagerness of the Member 
States to improve the already existing forms and constitute new forms of cooperation 
and data exchange. Regarding the data exchange, the existence of structured data 
collection and storage in databases or registers is once more highlighted by the Member 
States. Regarding intra-national cooperation, the authors of this report would like to 
stress the importance of joined, multidisciplinary intervention teams. Since cases of fraud 
often cover more fields then just the (particular) field of social security, interventions 
together with other social security institutions, tax authorities and police authorities can 
lead to the detection of cases of fraud and/or error which would not have been detected 
in the case of an intervention of only one of the parties concerned. On the international 
level, the creation or improvement of specialised units/teams to further develop the 
international cooperation and data exchange can be encouraged. Based on the country 
replies of the Member States, the Network of the National Contact Points (NCPs) and its 
Platform have contributed to the improvement of the fight against social security fraud 
and error in the framework of the EU Regulations. We therefore encourage the NCPs to 
further ameliorate their functioning and stimulate the social security institutions and 
other parties involved to make an appeal to other Member States’ NCPs where necessary. 
However, it has to be noted that there is still lots of work to be done, since the vast 
majority of Member States still report problems concerning cross-border cooperation and 
information exchange. Concerning data exchange on the national and international level, 
there is still some progression to be made. In this respect, regarding files processed by 
inspectorates/institutions, the activities of Belgium regarding Osiris can be taken as an 
example. The conclusion of bilateral cooperation and/or data exchange agreements are 
moves in the right direction, although in many cases the legal value of the agreements is 
questionable, e.g. in court. Multilateral agreements on an international level, cf. the 
Benelux and Nordic and Baltic initiatives, are welcomed and – as past experiences in 
other domains have proven – could prove to be a more steady legal ground for cross-
border cooperation and the exchange of information and an inspiration for supranational 
initiatives. 
Lastly, concerning the steps taken regarding the recovery of unduly paid benefits, based 
on the country replies, almost all the Member States made efforts regarding the recovery 
of unduly paid benefits and the application of other sanctions.23 The foregoing is in the 
view of the authors of this report a positive development. After all, these actions are not 
only essential to combat fraud and error, they also have a huge influence on the 
prevention of fraud and error, since they have a deterrent effect on (possible) frauds. 
Regarding the national legislation relevant to preventing and combating fraud and error, 
based on the data provided in the country sheets concerning the national legislation 
(Annex I), there is still practically no national legislation that specifically deals with fraud 
and error under the Regulations.24 Article 21(3) of the Law on State Social Insurance of 
Latvia, according to which the State Social Insurance Agency can transfer a person’s 
social insurance contributions made in another EU Member State to Latvia, is the only 
example of national legislation concerning social fraud and error in cross-border cases.  
                                                 
22 Cfr. 2.1.1.3 and 2.2.1.2. 
23 Cfr. 2.2.1.3 
24 Cfr. 2.3. 
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Based on the information provided by the Member States about specific problems in 
implementing the EU coordination rules which may lead to (at least risks of) fraud and 
error, various kinds of problems can be distinguished.  
Firstly, almost all the Member States expressed their concerns about the (absence 
of/difficulties regarding) the exchange of data between the Member States.25 The lack of 
a unified, formalised system of exchange of data is a source of anxiety and the lack of a 
legal base for the exchange of (bulk) data between Member States to combat fraud is 
denounced. The reason is that it can be debated whether the provisions on information 
exchange provided by the coordination Regulations are a sufficient legal basis in all cases 
dealing with fraud and error in particular regarding privacy and data protection issues, 
even more specifically in cases of fraud leading to criminal prosecution or administrative 
sanctions. As the reported steps taken to combat/prevent fraud and error and the 
reported bilateral/multilateral agreements in Annex II reveal, electronic data exchange 
between the Member States, and the resulting possibility of data matching, are still on 
the rise. Member States are still concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements in order 
to regulate the scope of the data exchange and the rights and duties which have to be 
respected by performing the exchange, the legal value of which is, unfortunately, all too 
often debatable. This leads to (legal) uncertainty and unresolved cases. There is only a 
minimal level of uniformity between the bilateral agreements, and the question arises to 
what extent the exchange of data is compatible with (national and European) rules on 
privacy and data protection. In some cases agreements are not reached just because of 
concerns resulting from the constraints of the national laws on the protection of personal 
data. Some Member States find that it does not seem possible to obtain satisfactory 
results by means of almost spontaneous initiatives implemented in the framework of 
administrative cooperation provided for under the current European legislation. Contrary 
to previous years, a couple of Member States do explicitly call for a European initiative. 
Almost all the concluded arrangements on data exchange and cooperation are bilateral; 
only the Nordic and Benelux countries have made efforts by concluding multilateral 
agreements.26 It is clear that there is a need for a fully operational and interoperable 
system for the electronic exchange of data and a comprehensive legal framework 
allowing for such exchange with due respect for privacy and data protection and reducing 
procedural risks to the absolute minimum. Awaiting the foregoing, we encourage the 
Member States to keep establishing new formalised, structured forms of data exchange, 
possibly by closing legally sound multilateral agreements on data exchange and by giving 
the competent institutions of other Member States access to institutions’ national 
databases in accordance to the relevant case law and with due regard to the upcoming 
changes resulting from, among others, the General Data Protection Regulation. The idea 
of creating a European-level database that registers migration outflows and inflows would 
definitely help to monitor the place of residence of workers and recipients of social 
welfare and social security benefits. The need and urgency for a more structured and 
preferably automated form of information exchange is clearly illustrated by a joint pilot 
study on data matching by Belgium and the Netherlands conducted within one of the 
Benelux Workgroups on cross-border social fraud. The pilot study revealed a stunning 
reality. Of 414 files exchanged, a first check of 100 files revealed 80(!) anomalies. The 
overall results also give ample food for thought and consideration: of the data shared 
between NSSO and SVB and matched for this pilot project, it turned out that an A1 form 
was issued for only 28% of the cases! Furthermore, 25 % of the cases were unknown to 
the SVB prior to the sharing of the data (no A1 issued or applied for) and of those 25 %, 
four employers each made 10 or more LIMOSA declarations for workers posted in 
Belgium. It also became clear that data on cases where an application for an A1 form 
was either denied or no longer being processed was not always shared. Last but not 
least, for at least 40% of the cases there is a medium to high risk the workers concerned 
were either socially insured in the wrong country or had no social security coverage at 
all. Bearing in mind Belgium and the Netherlands do not have a history of problematic 
cooperation in the field of social security coordination, and even taking into consideration 
                                                 
25 Cfr. 3.1. 
26 Cfr. 4. 
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these numbers are the result of a pilot study and have not been scrutinised for validity, 
reliability or statistically significance, it is the view of the authors that they clearly 
indicate that the prevalence of fraud and error is much higher than ever assumed.27 
Secondly, although it is clear that most of the Member States are willing to improve the 
level of cross-border investigation and cooperation in general, some problems still 
remain.28 Member States often experience difficulties regarding the determination of the 
competent institution in other Member States. Furthermore, the fact that the European 
coordination rules do not include procedures for the cross-border investigation of 
suspected cases of fraud and error is found problematic. These investigations are often 
subject to long response times, if a response is received at all. The authors are of the 
opinion that NCPs could definitely play a role in the improvement of cross-border 
cooperation and investigation. Furthermore, it still seems necessary to reflect about 
cross-border competences for inspection services. In addition, in case an investigation 
leads to a dialogue procedure between Member States, the absence of a binding effect 
and/or other consequences of decisions taken under this procedure are reported as a 
problem.  
Besides, problems concerning the applicable legislation are still present.29 Member States 
report that determining which country's legislation is applicable often remains a difficult 
question in practice. The rules on activity in more than one Member State are found hard 
to understand and difficult to apply. Based on the reported problems regarding the 
determination of the applicable legislation itself, it would be helpful if the European 
Commission invested in information dissemination (in the form of a campaign, a revision 
of the Practical Guide which takes into account the Member States’ remarks and 
questions etc) towards the social security institutions and other parties involved in the 
field of EU social security coordination, which again explains the precise content of the 
coordination Regulations and which also scrutinises the practical implementation of the 
coordination Regulations. Problems also arise from ignorance of the beneficiaries of social 
benefits regarding the applicable legislation. Therefore, the EU as well as the Member 
States themselves have to keep investing in information dissemination towards citizens 
as well.  Two more aspects with regard to the applicable legislation are considered as 
specific problems when implementing the coordination rules and as possibly leading to 
fraud and error. Firstly, problems still arise regarding the determination of the place of 
residence, the determination whether an undertaking is carrying out a significant part of 
its activity in the sending or posting State, and the determination of marginal work. The 
applicable criteria are found to be too ambiguous. Perhaps a reform of the criteria, 
making them more specific, could be helpful. Secondly, problems still arise from the use 
of PDs and SEDs, since those documents keep creating a vast opportunity for fraud and 
error. The PD A1 (among others) is found to be inadequately protected against forgery. 
Most concerns still go out to the difficulty and even impossibility to withdraw documents 
which are incorrectly issued by foreign institutions or individuals themselves. Further 
regulations concerning the PDs and SEDs seem appropriate.  
Subsequently, although compared to last year’s report considerably less Member States 
have reported such problems, some Member States still experience problems regarding 
the recovery of unduly paid benefits.30 
Lastly, it is clear that the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) still causes lots of 
problems, since the Member States reported various difficulties concerning the EHIC 
throughout the report. The fact that the EHIC still is a paper document which cannot be 
                                                 
27 For more information on this pilot study, please read the "Good Practice Fiche - Benelux cross-border 
cooperation in detecting and tackling social fraud and error – pilot project in the Construction sector" published 
on the website of the European Platform tackling undeclared work 
(http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?pager.offset=10&catId=1299&intPageId=4875&langId=en) 
28 Cfr. 3.2. 
29 Cfr. 3.3. 
30 Cfr. 3.4. 
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read electronically and which sometimes does not show the period of validity, is still 
found problematic.31 It would be preferable to make the EHIC electronically readable 
(perhaps by pairing the EHIC to the E-ID). 
Regarding the steps taken in the reference year (2016) to promote compliance by 
institutions and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to provide 
information to citizens, also this year various measures were reported.32 It is clear that 
all Member States have dedicated themselves to raising as much awareness as possible 
concerning the coordination rules, towards institutions, towards healthcare providers as 
well as towards citizens. Information was shared, trainings were held, all of this in order 
to minimise (the risk of) fraud and error in the field of social security.  
The reported best practices, lessons learned and issues and concerns reflect the essence 
of this report.33 Although the Member States are willing to improve the cross-border 
cooperation and communication (including data exchange) between them and although 
the already implemented measures concerning this matter are often quite successful, 
they still encounter serious problems that have been reported throughout the years. The 
fact that cross-border cooperation is in practice fully based on the goodwill of the 
Member States leads to the finding that some Member States are not always cooperative 
(they do not respond to questions, do not share data etc) and that other Member States 
report they cannot do anything about that. In addition, the best practices and lessons 
learned show that the prevention of and fight against fraud and error still is a major topic 
on their agendas and that they keep trying to implement innovative measures.  
The foregoing can also be deduced from the reported examples of or proposals or 
suggestions for measures to improve the overall tackling of fraud and error in the field of 
social security coordination which NCPs can operationalise without the need for changes 
to national of EU law.34 Member States for example encourage each other to make 
increased use of the European Platform to combat cross-border social security fraud and 
error and the NCPs themselves, by e.g. holding regular meetings between NCPs or the 
establishment of more sub-groups of the NCP Network on specific matters. Also the 
establishment of (thematic) databases held on the Platform was proposed. It is the view 
of the authors of this report that, concerning the foregoing, the risk of fragmentation of 
the NCPs and its consequences should be borne in mind, since it might hamper the 
efficiency of the NCPs (/NCP networks) and to at least some extent might give significant 
indications as to the limits of the establishment of NCPs.  
In view of the aforementioned, it appears that two fundamental steps need to be taken.  
In the first place, the cross-border cooperation between Member States’ national 
institutions of social security is still to be facilitated, with due regard for enforcement. 
Since Member States have been reporting issues with regard to cross-border cooperation 
and information exchange and in most cases seem unable to resolve these issues 
themselves, just like in previous years, the question whether further initiatives at Union 
level – in addition to the Commission's recent proposal to revise the social security 
coordination Regulations – are needed has to be addressed.  
Secondly, in connection with the first suggested step, the exchange of data between 
national competent authorities as well as the competent authorities in other Member 
States still has to be regulated, with due regard for data protection concerns. The lack of 
cooperation in this respect singlehandedly functions as a gateway to a number of issues 
amongst Member States in the field of social security coordination. In this respect, it 
should be noted that the Commission's recent proposal to revise the social security 
coordination Regulations includes several amendments in relation to data protection and 
                                                 
31 Cfr. 3.5. 
32 Cfr. 5.  
33 Cfr. 6. 
34 Cfr. 7. 
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it remains to be seen which further action concerning fraud and error in the context of 
social security coordination will be necessary. In addition, the launch of the EESI platform 
was mentioned to be very urgent by the Member States, since they believe that many 
problems regarding cooperation and data exchange will be solved by this platform. It 
seems clear that further initiatives at the European Union level are called for.35  
Last but not least, the vast majority of authors of the Member States' national reports 
seem unaware of the importance of a multidisciplinary approach to tackling at least some 
major forms of cross-border social fraud, e.g. cases of organised cross-border social 
fraud. Over the years, little to no reference was made to organised forms of cross-border 
social fraud, which is remarkable given the impact on national economies, the rights of 
workers involved as well as the image and perception of the European Union. We urge all 
Member States to raise awareness of organised forms of cross-border social fraud (e.g. 
posting schemes, organised benefit fraud, organised forms of labour exploitation etc), of 
the need for a multi-disciplinary approach to tackling such cases, and of the specific 
issues and opportunities that arise in multi-disciplinary environments. 
Despite the new approach to the collection of statistical information, as this year 
quantitative data were collected by the thematic questionnaires launched within the 
framework of the Administrative Commission, still only a few Member States provided 
figures on fraud and error. These fragmented data nonetheless give an indication of the 
size of fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination as well as an 
overview of some types of fraud and error. It might also encourage the missing Member 
States to provide these kind of data. By obtaining a higher response rate conclusions will 
also become less tentative. The current public debate shows several ad hoc needs for 
more detailed information on the size of fraud and error in the field of EU social security 
coordination. Those needs are perfect test cases to assess the relevance of the collected 
data and their level of detail. It might also be a reason to step up efforts in collecting and 
reporting data. 
 
  
                                                 
35 Recently a growing interest and new initiatives at the European level could be observed. The European 
Platform for tackling undeclared work seems to be gaining momentum (in this respect it seems odd it wasn't 
mentioned in the national reports), and the proposal for the revision of the Coordination Regulations, although 
still open for debate with the co-legislators, does put forward several improvements for tackling fraud and error 
and does more explicitly address data protection with regards to the exchange of information in the framework 
of social security coordination (Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 13 December 2016, 
COM(2016)815 final – 2016/0397 (COD), 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=849&newsId=2699&furtherNews=yes). Last but not 
least, in his State of the Union Address 2017 at the European Parliament, President Juncker announced plans 
for a European Labour Authority, aimed at strengthening the cooperation between competent authorities cross-
border situations. Furthermore, in his Letter of Intent to the European Parliament and Council, President 
Juncker announced by the end of 2018 a proposal to establish a European Labour Authority, as well as further 
initiatives in support of fair mobility, such as a European Social Security Number. (cf. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/european-labour-authority-factsheet_en.pdf).  
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